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The Escape from Balance Sheet Recession and the QE Trap details the many hidden dangers remaining as the world slowly recovers from the balance sheet recession of 2008. Author and leading economist Richard Koo explains the unique political and economic pitfalls that stand in the way of recovery from this rare type of recession that was largely overlooked by economists. Koo anticipated the current predicament in the West long before others and issued warnings in his previous books: Balance Sheet Recession and The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics. This new book illustrates how history is repeating itself in Europe while the United States, which learnt from the Japanese experience, is doing better by avoiding the fiscal cliff. However, because of the liberal dosage of quantitative easing already implemented, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan may face a treacherous path to normalcy in what Koo calls the QE Trap. He argues that it is necessary to understand balance sheet recession in order to resolve the Eurozone crisis, particularly the competitiveness problems. Koo issues warnings against those who are too ready to argue for structural reforms when the problems are actually with balance sheets. He re-examines Japan's two decades of experiences with this rare recession and offers an insider view on the Abenomics. On China, readers will gain a very different historical perspective as Koo argues that western commentators have forgotten their own history when they talk about the re-balancing of the Chinese economy.
* Learn from Japan which experienced the same predicament afflicting the West fifteen years earlier
* Discover how unwinding of quantitative easing will affect the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, as well as the emerging world
* Examine solutions to the Eurozone problems caused by two balance sheet recessions eight years apart
* Gain insight into China's problems from the West's own experiences with urbanisation
Koo, who developed the concept of balance sheet recession based on Japan's experience, took the revolution in macroeconomics started by John Maynard Keynes in 1936 to a new height. The Escape from Balance Sheet Recession and the QE Trap offers the world cure for balance sheet recession.
The Escape from Balance Sheet Recession and the QE Trap details the many hidden dangers remaining as the world slowly recovers from the balance sheet recession of 2008. Author and leading economist Richard Koo explains the unique political and economic pitfalls that stand in the way of recovery from this rare type of recession that was largely overlooked by economists. Koo anticipated the current predicament in the West long before others and issued warnings in his previous books: Balance Sheet Recession and The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics. This new book illustrates how history is repeating itself in Europe while the United States, which learnt from the Japanese experience, is doing better by avoiding the fiscal cliff. However, because of the liberal dosage of quantitative easing already implemented, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan may face a treacherous path to normalcy in what Koo calls the QE Trap. He argues that it is necessary to understand balance sheet recession in order to resolve the Eurozone crisis, particularly the competitiveness problems. Koo issues warnings against those who are too ready to argue for structural reforms when the problems are actually with balance sheets. He re-examines Japan's two decades of experiences with this rare recession and offers an insider view on the Abenomics. On China, readers will gain a very different historical perspective as Koo argues that western commentators have forgotten their own history when they talk about the re-balancing of the Chinese economy.
* Learn from Japan which experienced the same predicament afflicting the West fifteen years earlier
* Discover how unwinding of quantitative easing will affect the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, as well as the emerging world
* Examine solutions to the Eurozone problems caused by two balance sheet recessions eight years apart
* Gain insight into China's problems from the West's own experiences with urbanisation
Koo, who developed the concept of balance sheet recession based on Japan's experience, took the revolution in macroeconomics started by John Maynard Keynes in 1936 to a new height. The Escape from Balance Sheet Recession and the QE Trap offers the world cure for balance sheet recession.
RICHARD C. KOO is the Chief Economist of Nomura Research Institute, a research arm of Nomura Securities, the leading securities house in Japan. Best known for developing the concept of balance sheet recession, which is now used widely around the world, he has also advised successive prime ministers on how best to deal with Japan's economic and banking problems.
Consistently voted as one of the most reliable economists by Japanese market participants for over a decade, he was a Doctoral Fellow of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and an economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York prior to joining Nomura.
Foreword xix
About the Author xxv
Chapter 1 Balance Sheet Recession Theory-Basic Concepts 1
GDP and Inflation Fueled by Growth in Money Supply, Not Monetary Base 5
Japan Fell into Balance Sheet Recession in 1990s 10
Plunging Asset Prices Create Balance Sheet Problems for Businesses 12
Japanese Firms Rushed to Repair Balance Sheets by Paying Down Debt 13
"Correct" Private Sector Behavior Tipped Japan into Contractionary Equilibrium 14
Collapse of Japan's Bubble Destroyed ¥1,500 Trillion in Wealth 16
Why Japanese GDP Did Not Fall after Bubble Burst 18
Fiscal Stimulus Saved Japan's Economy 21
"Good" Fiscal Deficits Were Not Perceived as Such 23
Balance Sheet Recessions and the Limitations of Econometric Models 25
Fiscal Stimulus Works in Two Stages 28
FDR Made Same Mistake in 1937 28
Reactive Fiscal Stimulus Is Far Less Efficient 30
Fiscal Deficits Are Easily Financed during Balance Sheet Recessions 31
Self-Corrective Mechanism for Economies in Balance Sheet Recessions 33
Two Types of Fiscal Deficits Require Different Responses 34
Fiscal Deficits Must Be Viewed Relative to Private Savings 36
Consequences of Leaving Things Up to the Market in a Balance Sheet Recession 37
GFC Triggered by Insistence on Market Principles 40
Volcker Understood Systemic Crises 41
Little to Be Gained from Bashing Those Who Have Already Come to Their Senses 42
Recovery from Balance Sheet Recession Takes Time 43
Forward Guidance Important for Fiscal as Well as Monetary Policy 43
Fiscal Consolidation: Better Too Late Than Too Early 45
Three Points to Consider Regarding Costs for Future Generations 47
Japan Had a Shot at Full Recovery in 1996 . . . 49
Conflation of Balance Sheet and Structural Problems Extends Recession 50
Distinguishing Balance Sheet Recessions from Structural Problems and Financial Crises 53
Democracies Are Ill-Equipped for Dealing with Balance Sheet Recessions 55
Keynes Also Overlooked Private-Sector Debt Minimization 56
Those Who Prevent Crises Never Become Heroes 58
Democracy Plus Balance Sheet Recession Equals "Secular Stagnation" 59
Appendix to Chapter 1: Summary of Yin and Yang Phases of Economy 60
Chapter 2 Monetary Policy and the Quantitative Easing Trap 63
Monetary Policy Impotent without Demand for Funds 64
Mechanisms for Money Supply Growth 65
Government Borrowing Drove Money Supply Growth in Japan 67
Economics Dogged by Incorrect Analysis of Great Depression 68
Japanese Monetary Policy Has Relied on Fiscal Policy for Past 20 Years 72
Balance Sheet Recessions Triggered by Borrower-Side Problems, Financial Crises Triggered by Lender-Side Problems 74
Bernanke Himself Says QE2 Unlikely to Have Major Macroeconomic Benefits 75
Real Aim of QE2: Portfolio Rebalancing Effect 75
Can Higher Share Prices under QE2 Be Justified on DCF Basis? 77
QE2 a Big Gamble for Bernanke 77
QE Undermined U.S. Leadership in G20 78
QE with No Income Effect Harms Other Countries 79
Dollar-Buying Intervention by U.S. Authorities Would Have Produced Different Outcome 80
Inward Capital Controls Help Keep Bubbles Fueled by Hot Money in Check 80
QE Represents Government Intervention in Asset Markets 81
Operation Twist Lowered Long-Term Rates, but to No Effect 81
Operation Twist Provided Only Limited Economic Boost 83
Bernanke Admits the United States Faces Same Problems as Japan 84
Fed Overestimates Impact of Quantitative Easing 84
"Lower Long-Term Rates = Higher GDP" Formula Does Not Hold during Balance Sheet Recession 85
Fed Has Also Underestimated Costs of QE 85
Unorthodox Monetary Policy Distorts Signals from Bond Market 86
Needless QE Acts as Drag on Financial Institutions 87
Why Fed Embarked on QE3 Two Months before Presidential Election 88
Post-Bubble Wage Growth Nearly Identical in the United States and Japan 89
The "Inconvenient Truth" of the Real Cost of Quantitative Easing 89
BOJ's First Round of QE Was Easy to Wind Down Because It Was Conducted in Money Market 91
Redemption of Central Bank Bond Holdings Will Not Reduce Commercial Banks' Current Accounts 92
Government Issue of Refunding Bonds to Private Sector Would Absorb Excess Reserves 92
Redeeming Fed Bond Holdings Has Same Effect as Issuing Deficit Bonds 93
Strength of Private Loan Demand Different at Start and End of QE 94
Paying Interest on Excess Reserves Would Enable Rate Hikes . . . 94
But Cost Could Be Prohibitive 95
Cost of Winding Down QE Has Yet to Be Properly Analyzed 97
Debate over Winding Down QE Sparks "Bad" Rise in Rates 98
"QE Trap" Appears Increasingly Likely 98
Continued QE Trap More Likely Than Hyperinflation 101
BOJ Found Itself in Same Position in 2006 103
Fed Admits That Supply and Demand Matters, Too 103
Fed Changes Course Despite a 1.1 Percent Inflation Rate 104
Traditional Phillips Curve Relationship No Longer Holds 105
Upcoming Chapters in QE Saga 106
Capital Injection Could Also Be Threatened If Blame Shifts to Fed 106
Sales Should Start with Bonds Maturing Soon 107
Final Cost of QE Can Be Calculated Only at End of Fourth Chapter 108
Theoretical Debate on QE Has Focused Entirely on Benefits and Ignored Costs 108
Central Banks Should Establish a New Reaction Function to Drain Reserves 110
Emerging Markets Need Inward Capital Controls to Protect against QE 111
Japan Should Learn from Pioneers in QE Using Long-Term Bonds 112
Financial and Capital Markets during Balance Sheet Recessions 113
Balance Sheet Recession Brings Special Kind of Liquidity-Driven Market 115
Is Inflation of 1-2 Percent Too Low? 116
Does Inflation Improve People's Standard of Living? 116
Absence of Inflation Concerns May Have Lifted Utility of Consumption in Japan 117
QE Should Not Be Pursued Any Further Given Difficulty of Winding It Down 118
QE a Problematic Byproduct of Balance Sheet Recessions 119
Chapter 3 The United States in Balance Sheet Recession 121
Rating Agencies Need to Be More Tightly Regulated 123
Why Was Lehman Allowed to Fail? 124
TARP Prevented Bank Failures but Also Created Turmoil 127
U.S. Authorities Changed Course with "Pretend and Extend" 129
Fiscal Stimulus Shifts from "Three Ts" to "Three Ss" 131
Obama Has Yet to Disclose the Name of the Disease 132
Bernanke's "Fiscal Cliff" Warning Saved the U.S. Economy 134
Bernanke Declared Monetary Easing Could Not Offset Impact of Fiscal Cliff 136
Fall from Fiscal Cliff Triggered Japan's Deflation 137
U.S. Households Still Repairing Balance Sheets 138
Nonfinancial Corporate Sector Faced Difficult Years in the Wake of GFC 140
U.S. Companies Hit Far Harder by GFC Than by Collapse of Internet Bubble 141
Can U.S. Corporate Sector Become Economic Engine? 141
Long-Term Rate "Conundrum" Kept Housing Bubble Alive 142
Post-2007 Fed in Similar Position to BOJ in 1990s 143
Flow-of-Funds Data Suffer from Poor Accuracy 143
Bad Data Were Good for Policy Debate 145
Estimated Correctly, Private Sector Financial Surplus Continues to Shrink 146
Recovery in U.S. Private Sector Demand for Funds May Outpace Japan 148
Housing Market Strength during the First Half of 2013 May Have Contained Temporary Factors 149
Fed's Reputation Falls to Earth 150
Chapter 4 The Great Potential of Abenomics 153
BOJ Already Had a Massive QE Program in Place 155
Why Didn't Japan's Institutional Investors Follow Their Overseas Counterparts? 157
Yen Fell and Stocks Rose Because Japan's Institutional Investors Stayed in Bond Market 158
Honeymoon Altered Japan's Economic Landscape 159
Bond Market Reaction Ended Abenomics's Honeymoon 160
Private Sector Continues to Save after One Year of Abenomics 161
Japan's Growth over Last Year Attributable to Fiscal Policy 162
Can the Abe Administration Overcome the Trauma of Balance Sheet Recession? 164
The Trauma of the Balance Sheet Recession Will Be the Last Effect to Go 166
Focus of Structural Reforms Must Shift from Lenders to Borrowers 167
Is Japan's Slump Due to Shrinking Population or Balance Sheet Problems? 169
Slump in Domestic Demand Was Due to Balance Sheet Recession, Not Decline in Working-Age Population 170
Personal Financial Assets Have Already Been Invested Somewhere 171
Corporate Debt Pay-Downs Weighed on Consumption and Investment 171
Real Bottleneck in Japan's Economy: Lack of Loan Demand at Private Companies 172
Balance Sheet Recession Has Taught Japanese How to Be Frugal 173
Is Japan Really Closed to Immigration? 174
Japanese Economy Would Cease to Function without Foreigners 175
Agricultural Reforms a Major Step for LDP Government 176
Structural Reforms Are Microeconomic Policies That Take Years to Work 177
Scale of Structural Reform Is Also Important 177
We Should Not Expect More Good Fortune 178
Kuroda May Be Trying to Close Gap between Expectations and Reality ... 180
BOJ and Government Must Stress That Inflation Overshoot Will Not Be Tolerated 182
BOJ Had Weapon to Prevent JGB Crash during Balance Sheet Recession 183
No One Has Criticized Japan for Currency Manipulation 184
Japan Supported Global Economy for Four Years after Lehman Collapse 185
Real Effective...
| Erscheinungsjahr: | 2014 |
|---|---|
| Fachbereich: | Volkswirtschaft |
| Genre: | Wirtschaft |
| Rubrik: | Recht & Wirtschaft |
| Medium: | Buch |
| Inhalt: | Foreword xixAbout the Author xxvCHAPTER 1 Balance Sheet Recession Theory--Basic Concepts 1CHAPTER 2 Monetary Policy and the Quantitative Easing Trap 63CHAPTER 3 The United States in Balance Sheet Recession 121CHAPTER 4 The Great Potential of Abenomics 15 |
| ISBN-13: | 9781119028123 |
| ISBN-10: | 1119028124 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Einband: | Gebunden |
| Autor: | Koo, Richard C |
| Hersteller: |
Wiley
John Wiley & Sons |
| Maße: | 236 x 154 x 32 mm |
| Von/Mit: | Richard C Koo |
| Erscheinungsdatum: | 01.11.2014 |
| Gewicht: | 0,587 kg |
RICHARD C. KOO is the Chief Economist of Nomura Research Institute, a research arm of Nomura Securities, the leading securities house in Japan. Best known for developing the concept of balance sheet recession, which is now used widely around the world, he has also advised successive prime ministers on how best to deal with Japan's economic and banking problems.
Consistently voted as one of the most reliable economists by Japanese market participants for over a decade, he was a Doctoral Fellow of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and an economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York prior to joining Nomura.
Foreword xix
About the Author xxv
Chapter 1 Balance Sheet Recession Theory-Basic Concepts 1
GDP and Inflation Fueled by Growth in Money Supply, Not Monetary Base 5
Japan Fell into Balance Sheet Recession in 1990s 10
Plunging Asset Prices Create Balance Sheet Problems for Businesses 12
Japanese Firms Rushed to Repair Balance Sheets by Paying Down Debt 13
"Correct" Private Sector Behavior Tipped Japan into Contractionary Equilibrium 14
Collapse of Japan's Bubble Destroyed ¥1,500 Trillion in Wealth 16
Why Japanese GDP Did Not Fall after Bubble Burst 18
Fiscal Stimulus Saved Japan's Economy 21
"Good" Fiscal Deficits Were Not Perceived as Such 23
Balance Sheet Recessions and the Limitations of Econometric Models 25
Fiscal Stimulus Works in Two Stages 28
FDR Made Same Mistake in 1937 28
Reactive Fiscal Stimulus Is Far Less Efficient 30
Fiscal Deficits Are Easily Financed during Balance Sheet Recessions 31
Self-Corrective Mechanism for Economies in Balance Sheet Recessions 33
Two Types of Fiscal Deficits Require Different Responses 34
Fiscal Deficits Must Be Viewed Relative to Private Savings 36
Consequences of Leaving Things Up to the Market in a Balance Sheet Recession 37
GFC Triggered by Insistence on Market Principles 40
Volcker Understood Systemic Crises 41
Little to Be Gained from Bashing Those Who Have Already Come to Their Senses 42
Recovery from Balance Sheet Recession Takes Time 43
Forward Guidance Important for Fiscal as Well as Monetary Policy 43
Fiscal Consolidation: Better Too Late Than Too Early 45
Three Points to Consider Regarding Costs for Future Generations 47
Japan Had a Shot at Full Recovery in 1996 . . . 49
Conflation of Balance Sheet and Structural Problems Extends Recession 50
Distinguishing Balance Sheet Recessions from Structural Problems and Financial Crises 53
Democracies Are Ill-Equipped for Dealing with Balance Sheet Recessions 55
Keynes Also Overlooked Private-Sector Debt Minimization 56
Those Who Prevent Crises Never Become Heroes 58
Democracy Plus Balance Sheet Recession Equals "Secular Stagnation" 59
Appendix to Chapter 1: Summary of Yin and Yang Phases of Economy 60
Chapter 2 Monetary Policy and the Quantitative Easing Trap 63
Monetary Policy Impotent without Demand for Funds 64
Mechanisms for Money Supply Growth 65
Government Borrowing Drove Money Supply Growth in Japan 67
Economics Dogged by Incorrect Analysis of Great Depression 68
Japanese Monetary Policy Has Relied on Fiscal Policy for Past 20 Years 72
Balance Sheet Recessions Triggered by Borrower-Side Problems, Financial Crises Triggered by Lender-Side Problems 74
Bernanke Himself Says QE2 Unlikely to Have Major Macroeconomic Benefits 75
Real Aim of QE2: Portfolio Rebalancing Effect 75
Can Higher Share Prices under QE2 Be Justified on DCF Basis? 77
QE2 a Big Gamble for Bernanke 77
QE Undermined U.S. Leadership in G20 78
QE with No Income Effect Harms Other Countries 79
Dollar-Buying Intervention by U.S. Authorities Would Have Produced Different Outcome 80
Inward Capital Controls Help Keep Bubbles Fueled by Hot Money in Check 80
QE Represents Government Intervention in Asset Markets 81
Operation Twist Lowered Long-Term Rates, but to No Effect 81
Operation Twist Provided Only Limited Economic Boost 83
Bernanke Admits the United States Faces Same Problems as Japan 84
Fed Overestimates Impact of Quantitative Easing 84
"Lower Long-Term Rates = Higher GDP" Formula Does Not Hold during Balance Sheet Recession 85
Fed Has Also Underestimated Costs of QE 85
Unorthodox Monetary Policy Distorts Signals from Bond Market 86
Needless QE Acts as Drag on Financial Institutions 87
Why Fed Embarked on QE3 Two Months before Presidential Election 88
Post-Bubble Wage Growth Nearly Identical in the United States and Japan 89
The "Inconvenient Truth" of the Real Cost of Quantitative Easing 89
BOJ's First Round of QE Was Easy to Wind Down Because It Was Conducted in Money Market 91
Redemption of Central Bank Bond Holdings Will Not Reduce Commercial Banks' Current Accounts 92
Government Issue of Refunding Bonds to Private Sector Would Absorb Excess Reserves 92
Redeeming Fed Bond Holdings Has Same Effect as Issuing Deficit Bonds 93
Strength of Private Loan Demand Different at Start and End of QE 94
Paying Interest on Excess Reserves Would Enable Rate Hikes . . . 94
But Cost Could Be Prohibitive 95
Cost of Winding Down QE Has Yet to Be Properly Analyzed 97
Debate over Winding Down QE Sparks "Bad" Rise in Rates 98
"QE Trap" Appears Increasingly Likely 98
Continued QE Trap More Likely Than Hyperinflation 101
BOJ Found Itself in Same Position in 2006 103
Fed Admits That Supply and Demand Matters, Too 103
Fed Changes Course Despite a 1.1 Percent Inflation Rate 104
Traditional Phillips Curve Relationship No Longer Holds 105
Upcoming Chapters in QE Saga 106
Capital Injection Could Also Be Threatened If Blame Shifts to Fed 106
Sales Should Start with Bonds Maturing Soon 107
Final Cost of QE Can Be Calculated Only at End of Fourth Chapter 108
Theoretical Debate on QE Has Focused Entirely on Benefits and Ignored Costs 108
Central Banks Should Establish a New Reaction Function to Drain Reserves 110
Emerging Markets Need Inward Capital Controls to Protect against QE 111
Japan Should Learn from Pioneers in QE Using Long-Term Bonds 112
Financial and Capital Markets during Balance Sheet Recessions 113
Balance Sheet Recession Brings Special Kind of Liquidity-Driven Market 115
Is Inflation of 1-2 Percent Too Low? 116
Does Inflation Improve People's Standard of Living? 116
Absence of Inflation Concerns May Have Lifted Utility of Consumption in Japan 117
QE Should Not Be Pursued Any Further Given Difficulty of Winding It Down 118
QE a Problematic Byproduct of Balance Sheet Recessions 119
Chapter 3 The United States in Balance Sheet Recession 121
Rating Agencies Need to Be More Tightly Regulated 123
Why Was Lehman Allowed to Fail? 124
TARP Prevented Bank Failures but Also Created Turmoil 127
U.S. Authorities Changed Course with "Pretend and Extend" 129
Fiscal Stimulus Shifts from "Three Ts" to "Three Ss" 131
Obama Has Yet to Disclose the Name of the Disease 132
Bernanke's "Fiscal Cliff" Warning Saved the U.S. Economy 134
Bernanke Declared Monetary Easing Could Not Offset Impact of Fiscal Cliff 136
Fall from Fiscal Cliff Triggered Japan's Deflation 137
U.S. Households Still Repairing Balance Sheets 138
Nonfinancial Corporate Sector Faced Difficult Years in the Wake of GFC 140
U.S. Companies Hit Far Harder by GFC Than by Collapse of Internet Bubble 141
Can U.S. Corporate Sector Become Economic Engine? 141
Long-Term Rate "Conundrum" Kept Housing Bubble Alive 142
Post-2007 Fed in Similar Position to BOJ in 1990s 143
Flow-of-Funds Data Suffer from Poor Accuracy 143
Bad Data Were Good for Policy Debate 145
Estimated Correctly, Private Sector Financial Surplus Continues to Shrink 146
Recovery in U.S. Private Sector Demand for Funds May Outpace Japan 148
Housing Market Strength during the First Half of 2013 May Have Contained Temporary Factors 149
Fed's Reputation Falls to Earth 150
Chapter 4 The Great Potential of Abenomics 153
BOJ Already Had a Massive QE Program in Place 155
Why Didn't Japan's Institutional Investors Follow Their Overseas Counterparts? 157
Yen Fell and Stocks Rose Because Japan's Institutional Investors Stayed in Bond Market 158
Honeymoon Altered Japan's Economic Landscape 159
Bond Market Reaction Ended Abenomics's Honeymoon 160
Private Sector Continues to Save after One Year of Abenomics 161
Japan's Growth over Last Year Attributable to Fiscal Policy 162
Can the Abe Administration Overcome the Trauma of Balance Sheet Recession? 164
The Trauma of the Balance Sheet Recession Will Be the Last Effect to Go 166
Focus of Structural Reforms Must Shift from Lenders to Borrowers 167
Is Japan's Slump Due to Shrinking Population or Balance Sheet Problems? 169
Slump in Domestic Demand Was Due to Balance Sheet Recession, Not Decline in Working-Age Population 170
Personal Financial Assets Have Already Been Invested Somewhere 171
Corporate Debt Pay-Downs Weighed on Consumption and Investment 171
Real Bottleneck in Japan's Economy: Lack of Loan Demand at Private Companies 172
Balance Sheet Recession Has Taught Japanese How to Be Frugal 173
Is Japan Really Closed to Immigration? 174
Japanese Economy Would Cease to Function without Foreigners 175
Agricultural Reforms a Major Step for LDP Government 176
Structural Reforms Are Microeconomic Policies That Take Years to Work 177
Scale of Structural Reform Is Also Important 177
We Should Not Expect More Good Fortune 178
Kuroda May Be Trying to Close Gap between Expectations and Reality ... 180
BOJ and Government Must Stress That Inflation Overshoot Will Not Be Tolerated 182
BOJ Had Weapon to Prevent JGB Crash during Balance Sheet Recession 183
No One Has Criticized Japan for Currency Manipulation 184
Japan Supported Global Economy for Four Years after Lehman Collapse 185
Real Effective...
| Erscheinungsjahr: | 2014 |
|---|---|
| Fachbereich: | Volkswirtschaft |
| Genre: | Wirtschaft |
| Rubrik: | Recht & Wirtschaft |
| Medium: | Buch |
| Inhalt: | Foreword xixAbout the Author xxvCHAPTER 1 Balance Sheet Recession Theory--Basic Concepts 1CHAPTER 2 Monetary Policy and the Quantitative Easing Trap 63CHAPTER 3 The United States in Balance Sheet Recession 121CHAPTER 4 The Great Potential of Abenomics 15 |
| ISBN-13: | 9781119028123 |
| ISBN-10: | 1119028124 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Einband: | Gebunden |
| Autor: | Koo, Richard C |
| Hersteller: |
Wiley
John Wiley & Sons |
| Maße: | 236 x 154 x 32 mm |
| Von/Mit: | Richard C Koo |
| Erscheinungsdatum: | 01.11.2014 |
| Gewicht: | 0,587 kg |
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