The late Horacio Arló-Costa was Professor of Philosophy at Carnegie Mellon University, Pennsylvania. Arló-Costa served as editor for the Review of Symbolic Logic, as area editor in epistemology for Synthese and as a member of the editorial board for the Journal of Philosophical Logic. Vincent F. Hendricks is Director of the Center for Information and Bubble Studies, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His recent publications include Handbook of Formal Philosophy (2012), Epistemic Logic: 5 Questions (2010), Probability and Statistics: 5 Questions (2009), Mainstream and Formal Epistemology (2007) and The Convergence of Scientific Knowledge (2001). Johan van Benthem is University Professor emeritus of pure and applied logic at the University of Amsterdam, Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University and Distinguished Foreign Expert at Tsinghua University, Beijing. His recent publications include Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction (2011), Modal Logic for Open Minds (2010), Exploring Logical Dynamics (1996) and Language in Action (1995). Van Benthem is co-editor, with Alice ter Meulen, of the Handbook of Logic and Language (1997).

Strengthens the ties between research in philosophy and its neighbouring intellectual principles

Provides separate introductions to the five fields of formal epistemology, an elaborate index and suggestions for further reading

Offers a complete teaching and research package for students as well as research scholars

Introduction.- 1. Agency and interaction: what we are and what we do in formal epistemology; Jeffrey Helzner and Vincent F. Hendricks.- Part 1. Bayesian Epistemology: Introduction.- 2. Truth and probability; Frank P. Ramsey.- 3. Probable knowledge; Richard C. Jeffrey.- 4. Fine-­¿grained opinion, probability and the logic of full belief; Bas C. van Fraassen.- 5. A theory of higher order probabilities; Haim Gaifman.- 6. On indeterminate probabilities; Isaac Levi.- 6. On indeterminate probabilities; Isaac Levi.- 7. Why I am not a Bayesian; Clark Glymour.- 8. A mistake in dynamic coherence arguments? Brian Skyrms.- 9. Some problems for conditionalization and reflection; Frank Arntzenius.- 10. Stopping to reflect; Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld and Joseph B. Kadane.- Part II. Belief Change: Introduction.- 11. On the logic of theory change: partial meet contraction and revision functions; Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors and David Makinson.- 12. Theory contraction and base contraction unified; Sven Ove Hansson.- 13. How infallible but corrigible full belief is possible; Isaac Levi.- 14. Belief contraction in the context of the General Theory of Rational Choice; Hans Rott.- 15. A survey of ranking theory; Wolfgang Spohn.- Part III. Decision Theory: Introduction.- 16. Allais's Paradox; Leonard Savage.- 17. Decision theory without 'independence' or without 'ordering'; Teddy Seidenfeld.- 18. Ambiguity and the Bayesian paradigm; Itzhak Gilboa and Massimo Marinacci.- 19. State dependent utilities; Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld and Joseph B. Kadane.- 20. Causal decision theory; James M. Joyce and Allan Gibbard.- 21. Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnemann.- Part IV. Logics of Knowledge and Belief: Introduction.- 22. Epistemology without knowledge and without belief; Jaakko Hintikka.- 23. Epistemic operators; Fred Dretske.- 24. Elusive knowledge; David Lewis.- 25. Knowledge and skepticism; RobertNozick.- 26. On logics of knowledge and belief; Robert Stalnaker.- 27. Sentences, belief and logical omniscience, or what does deduction tell us? Rohit Parikh.- 28. The logic of justification; Sergei Artemov.- 29. Learning theory and epistemology; Kevin T. Kelly.- 30. Some computational constraints in epistemic logic; Timothy Williamson.- Part V. Interactive Epistemology: Introduction.- 31. Convention (an excerpt); David Lewis.- 32. Three views of common understanding; Jon Barwise.- 33. The logic of public announcements, common knowledge and private suspicions; Alexandru Baltag, Lawrence S. Moss and S¿awomir Solecki.- 34. A qualitative theory of dynamic interactive belief revision; Alexandru Baltag and Sonja Smets.- 35. Agreeing to disagree; Robert J. Aumann.- 36. Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium; Robert J. Aumann and Adam Brandenburger.- 37. Knowledge, belief and counterfactual reasoning in games; Robert Stalnaker.- 38. Substantive rationality and backward induction; JosephY. Halpern.¿