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When Insurers Go Bust
An Economic Analysis of the Role and Design of Prudential Regulation
Taschenbuch von Guillaume Plantin (u. a.)
Sprache: Englisch

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Beschreibung
In the 1990s, large insurance companies failed in virtually every major market, prompting a fierce and ongoing debate about how to better protect policyholders. Drawing lessons from the failures of four insurance companies, When Insurers Go Bust dramatically advances this debate by arguing that the current approach to insurance regulation should be replaced with mechanisms that replicate the governance of non-financial firms.

Rather than immediately addressing the minutiae of supervision, Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet first identify a fundamental economic rationale for supervising the solvency of insurance companies: policyholders are the "bankers" of insurance companies. But because policyholders are too dispersed to effectively monitor insurers, it might be efficient to delegate monitoring to an institution--a prudential authority. Applying recent developments in corporate finance theory and the economic theory of organizations, the authors describe in practical terms how such authorities could be created and given the incentives to behave exactly like bankers behave toward borrowers, as "tough" claimholders.
In the 1990s, large insurance companies failed in virtually every major market, prompting a fierce and ongoing debate about how to better protect policyholders. Drawing lessons from the failures of four insurance companies, When Insurers Go Bust dramatically advances this debate by arguing that the current approach to insurance regulation should be replaced with mechanisms that replicate the governance of non-financial firms.

Rather than immediately addressing the minutiae of supervision, Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet first identify a fundamental economic rationale for supervising the solvency of insurance companies: policyholders are the "bankers" of insurance companies. But because policyholders are too dispersed to effectively monitor insurers, it might be efficient to delegate monitoring to an institution--a prudential authority. Applying recent developments in corporate finance theory and the economic theory of organizations, the authors describe in practical terms how such authorities could be created and given the incentives to behave exactly like bankers behave toward borrowers, as "tough" claimholders.
Über den Autor
Guillaume Plantin & Jean-Charles Rochet
With a foreword by Hyun Song Shin
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2016
Fachbereich: Volkswirtschaft
Genre: Importe, Wirtschaft
Rubrik: Recht & Wirtschaft
Medium: Taschenbuch
Inhalt: Kartoniert / Broschiert
ISBN-13: 9780691170985
ISBN-10: 0691170983
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Plantin, Guillaume
Rochet, Jean-Charles
Hersteller: Princeton University Press
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße: 216 x 140 x 6 mm
Von/Mit: Guillaume Plantin (u. a.)
Erscheinungsdatum: 28.06.2016
Gewicht: 0,152 kg
Artikel-ID: 104145542
Über den Autor
Guillaume Plantin & Jean-Charles Rochet
With a foreword by Hyun Song Shin
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2016
Fachbereich: Volkswirtschaft
Genre: Importe, Wirtschaft
Rubrik: Recht & Wirtschaft
Medium: Taschenbuch
Inhalt: Kartoniert / Broschiert
ISBN-13: 9780691170985
ISBN-10: 0691170983
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Plantin, Guillaume
Rochet, Jean-Charles
Hersteller: Princeton University Press
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße: 216 x 140 x 6 mm
Von/Mit: Guillaume Plantin (u. a.)
Erscheinungsdatum: 28.06.2016
Gewicht: 0,152 kg
Artikel-ID: 104145542
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