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Beschreibung
This book sheds new light on the history of the philosophically crucial notion of intentionality, which accounts for one of the most distinctive aspects of our mental life: the fact that our thoughts are about objects. Intentionality is often described as a certain kind of relation. Focusing on Franz Brentano, who introduced the notion into contemporary philosophy, and on the Aristotelian tradition, which was Brentanös main source of inspiration, the book reveals a rich history of debate on precisely the relational nature of intentionality. It shows that Brentano and the Aristotelian authors from which he drew not only addressed the question whether intentionality is a relation, but also devoted extensive discussions to what kind of relation it is, if any.
The book aims to show that Brentano distinguishes the intentional relation from two other relations with which it might be confused, namely, causality and reference, which also hold between thoughts and their objects. Intentionality accounts for the aboutness of a thought; causality, by contrast, explains how the thought is generated, and reference, understood as a sort of similarity, occurs when the object towards which the thought is directed exists. Brentano claims to find some anticipation of his views in Aristotle. This book argues that, whether or not Brentanös interpretation of Aristotle is correct, his claim is true of the Aristotelian tradition as a whole, since followers of Aristotle more or less explicitly made some or all of Brentanös distinctions. This is demonstrated through examination of some major figures of the Aristotelian tradition (broadly understood), including Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Neoplatonic commentators, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Francisco Suárez.
The book aims to show that Brentano distinguishes the intentional relation from two other relations with which it might be confused, namely, causality and reference, which also hold between thoughts and their objects. Intentionality accounts for the aboutness of a thought; causality, by contrast, explains how the thought is generated, and reference, understood as a sort of similarity, occurs when the object towards which the thought is directed exists. Brentano claims to find some anticipation of his views in Aristotle. This book argues that, whether or not Brentanös interpretation of Aristotle is correct, his claim is true of the Aristotelian tradition as a whole, since followers of Aristotle more or less explicitly made some or all of Brentanös distinctions. This is demonstrated through examination of some major figures of the Aristotelian tradition (broadly understood), including Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Neoplatonic commentators, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Francisco Suárez.
This book combines a longue durée approach ¿ focusing on the long-term evolution of philosophical concepts rather than restricting itself to a specific author or period ¿ with systematic analysis in thehistory of philosophy. By studying Brentano and the Aristotelian authors with theoretical sensitivity, it also aims to contribute to our understanding of intentionality and cognate features of the mind.
This book sheds new light on the history of the philosophically crucial notion of intentionality, which accounts for one of the most distinctive aspects of our mental life: the fact that our thoughts are about objects. Intentionality is often described as a certain kind of relation. Focusing on Franz Brentano, who introduced the notion into contemporary philosophy, and on the Aristotelian tradition, which was Brentanös main source of inspiration, the book reveals a rich history of debate on precisely the relational nature of intentionality. It shows that Brentano and the Aristotelian authors from which he drew not only addressed the question whether intentionality is a relation, but also devoted extensive discussions to what kind of relation it is, if any.
The book aims to show that Brentano distinguishes the intentional relation from two other relations with which it might be confused, namely, causality and reference, which also hold between thoughts and their objects. Intentionality accounts for the aboutness of a thought; causality, by contrast, explains how the thought is generated, and reference, understood as a sort of similarity, occurs when the object towards which the thought is directed exists. Brentano claims to find some anticipation of his views in Aristotle. This book argues that, whether or not Brentanös interpretation of Aristotle is correct, his claim is true of the Aristotelian tradition as a whole, since followers of Aristotle more or less explicitly made some or all of Brentanös distinctions. This is demonstrated through examination of some major figures of the Aristotelian tradition (broadly understood), including Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Neoplatonic commentators, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Francisco Suárez.
The book aims to show that Brentano distinguishes the intentional relation from two other relations with which it might be confused, namely, causality and reference, which also hold between thoughts and their objects. Intentionality accounts for the aboutness of a thought; causality, by contrast, explains how the thought is generated, and reference, understood as a sort of similarity, occurs when the object towards which the thought is directed exists. Brentano claims to find some anticipation of his views in Aristotle. This book argues that, whether or not Brentanös interpretation of Aristotle is correct, his claim is true of the Aristotelian tradition as a whole, since followers of Aristotle more or less explicitly made some or all of Brentanös distinctions. This is demonstrated through examination of some major figures of the Aristotelian tradition (broadly understood), including Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Neoplatonic commentators, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Francisco Suárez.
This book combines a longue durée approach ¿ focusing on the long-term evolution of philosophical concepts rather than restricting itself to a specific author or period ¿ with systematic analysis in thehistory of philosophy. By studying Brentano and the Aristotelian authors with theoretical sensitivity, it also aims to contribute to our understanding of intentionality and cognate features of the mind.
Über den Autor
Hamid Taieb is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Salzburg. He works on Austro-German philosophy, mostly on the school of Brentano. His research interests also include the Aristotelian tradition, especially Latin scholasticism.
Zusammenfassung
Presents a unique historical study on intentionality's relational nature
Provides an unprecedented analysis of the historical discussions on intentionality, causality and reference
Gives a novel account of the long-term influences of Aristotle's psychology up to Brentano
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Chapter1. Introduction: Is Intentionality a Relation.- Chapter2. Psychic Causality.- Chapter3. Intentionality as a Relation.- Chapter4. Reference.- Chapter5.Conclusion: Intentionality and History.
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: | 2019 |
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Fachbereich: | Allgemeines |
Genre: | Geisteswissenschaften, Kunst, Musik, Philosophie |
Jahrhundert: | Antike |
Rubrik: | Geisteswissenschaften |
Thema: | Lexika |
Medium: | Buch |
Inhalt: |
xii
213 S. 1 s/w Illustr. 213 p. 1 illus. |
ISBN-13: | 9783319988863 |
ISBN-10: | 3319988867 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Herstellernummer: | 978-3-319-98886-3 |
Einband: | Gebunden |
Autor: | Taieb, Hamid |
Auflage: | 1st edition 2018 |
Hersteller: | Springer International Publishing |
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: | Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, D-69121 Heidelberg, juergen.hartmann@springer.com |
Maße: | 241 x 160 x 18 mm |
Von/Mit: | Hamid Taieb |
Erscheinungsdatum: | 05.02.2019 |
Gewicht: | 0,512 kg |