Preface - Abram J. Chayes
Introduction - Robert H. Mnookin and Jonathan R. Cohen
PART ONE: NEGOTIATION THEORY REVISITED
Toward a Theory of Representation in Negotiation - Joel Cutcher-Gershenfield and Michael Watkins
Commentary
The Shifting Role of Agents in Interest-Based Negotiations - Lawrence E. Susskind
Authority of an Agent - Roger Fisher and Wayne Davis
When is Less Better?
Commentary
Rational Authority Allocation to an Agent - Max H Bazerman
Minimizing Agency Costs in Two-Level Games - Kalypso Nicolaidis
Lessons from the Trade Authority Controversies in the United States and the European Union
Commentary
Minimizing Agency Costs - Gordon M. Kaufman
Towards a Testable Theory
PART TWO: AGENCY IN CONTEXT
The Challenges for International Diplomatic Agents - Eileen F. Babbitt
Commentary
The Role of Agents in International Negotiation - Bruce Patton
Law and Power in Agency Relationships - Jeswald W. Salacuse
Commentary
Law and Power in Agency Relationships - Janet Martinez
Agency in the Context of Labor Negotiations - Robert B. McKersie
Commentary
Agency in the Context of Labor Management - Kathleen Valley
Legislators as Negotiators - David C. King and Richard J. Zeckhauser
Commentary
Turning the Tables - Jonathan R. Cohen
Negotiation as the Exogenous Variable
First, Let¿s Kill All the Agents! - Michael Wheeler
Commentary
Unnecessary Toughness - Brian S. Mandell
Hard Bargaining as an Extreme Sport
PART THREE: PRESCRIPTIVE IMPLICATIONS
Major Themes and Prescriptive Implications - Lawrence E. Susskind and Robert H. Mnookin
Agents in Negotiations - Terri Kurtzberg et al
Toward Testable Propositions
Annotated Bibliography of Selected Sources - Pacey C. Foster and Jonathan R. Cohen