Integrates research across psychological disciplines to form the first resource on the topic of embodiment

Links topical chapters to theoretical perspectives on interoception, grounded cognition, and conceptual metaphor

Challenges traditionally accepted ideas about perceiving, thinking and doing

Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Psychology of Embodiment

Authors: Michael D. Robinson [...] North Dakota State University, USA, & Laura E. Thomas [...] North Dakota State University, USA

Section 1: Theoretical Foundations

Although all definitions of embodiment emphasize the relevance of body-based (e.g., sensory or motoric) processes to some extent, there is actually a diversity of relevant theoretical perspectives (Schwarz & Lee, in press). In the first section of the volume, we sought to gather some of these perspectives into a single place, so that the reader can use the relevant material as a basis for understanding some of the more empirical chapters that follow. The relevant chapters cover several major theoretical perspectives, which include grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2008), interoception (Craig, 2003), and conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).

Chapter 2: Dynamic Grounding of Concepts: Implications for Emotion and Social Cognition

Contact Author: Piotr Winkielman [...] University of California, San Diego, USA

According to embodied cognition theories, concepts are grounded in neural systems that produce experiential and motor states. Concepts are also contextually situated and thus engage sensorimotor resources in a dynamic, flexible way. Finally, conceptual understanding unfolds in time, reflecting embodied as well as linguistic and social influences. In this chapter, we focus on concepts from the domain of social cognition and emotion while detailing ways in which (and circumstances under which) they link to sensorimotor and interoceptive systems.

Chapter 3: The Feelings-as-Information Perspective on Embodiment

Contact Author: Gerald L. Clore [...] University of Virginia, USA

We focus on emotions and feeling, the embodied nature of which reflects more than their bodily concomitants. We explore several themes including that: (1) Feelings are difficult to describe in words. But feelings can be characterized (and partially elicited) by choosing words with the right connotations. As seen in literature, song, poetry, and drama, the connotative meanings of words allow hearers and readers to feel as well as to understand. (2) The feelings-as-information approach (Clore, Schiller, & Shaked, 2018), augmented with cognitive priming processes, illuminate the confusing and sometimes controversial findings concerning embodied metaphors. We examine evidence concerning whether such phenomena involve metaphor or merely associative relationships. We also address questions about the conditions under which the effects are reversible. (3) Finally, we step back and view embodied psychology from a resource perspective. We draw on behavioral ecology and the embodied perception work of Proffitt (2006) to ask how the needs for social and physical resources guide human behavior.

Chapter 4: Interoceptive Approaches to Embodiment

Contact Author: André Schulz [...] University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg

Other Authors (If Known): Claus Vögele

Interoception is defined as a mechanism to process and perceive internal bodily signals. Influential theories concerning such processes, such as the multi-faceted model by Garfinkel et al., the process model by Vaitl and the predictive coding model, are addressed. This includes a definition of the most common interoceptive terms - i.e., interoceptive accuracy, sensibility, sensitivity, awareness, and prediction error. We then present examples for interoceptive tasks and paradigms to assess different elements of interoceptive theories. Typical interoceptive indicators include self-reports, behavioral measures, and neurophysiological indices. Finally, we discuss existing evidence that these interoceptive indicators are related to emotional experience and emotion regulation, consciousness, and decision-making. These findings illustrate the relevance of interoceptive indicators for embodiment.

Chapter 5: The Metaphorical Body

Contact Author: Raymond W. Gibbs Jr. ([...]), Cognitive Scientist and Former Distinguished Professor, University of California, Santa Cruz, USA

Bodily experience serves as a source domain to better understand less structured, and typically more abstract, target domains (e.g., LIFE IS A JOURNEY, in which bodily experiences associated with journeys are mapped to better structure our understanding of life). This work on "embodied conceptual metaphor" is a key part of the embodied revolution in the cognitive sciences. The present chapter, however, explores the possibility that many source domains arising from bodily experience may themselves be inherently metaphorical. I will present a variety of examples from cognitive linguistics, psychology, and medical anthropology to show how varied bodily experiences are likely understood in symbolic and metaphorical terms. Following this, I discuss some of the methodological challenges associated with further empirical study of the "metaphorical body" and evaluate several possible skeptical responses to the claim that bodily experience is inherently metaphorical. Finally, I outline several theoretical implications of this metaphorical body hypothesis for our understanding of embodiment, cognition, and metaphorical experience in several real-world contexts.

Chapter 6: The Extended Mind Thesis and Its Applications

Other Authors (If Known): Sergei Levin

Proponents of the extended mind story hold that even quite familiar human mental states (such as states of believing) can be realized, in part, by structures and processes located outside the human head. Such claims paint the mind (or better, the physical machinery that realizes some of our cognitive processes and mental states) as, under humanly attainable conditions, extending beyond the bounds of skin and skull. In recent years, a fruitful debate about the validity and scope of the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) has emerged both within the empirical sciences (e.g., psychology and neuroscience) and in the philosophy of mind. The goal of this chapter is to investigate the prospects of empirical support for EMT by clarifying to which extent researchers in psychology and neuroscience already implicitly assume extended cognition ideas or even actively operate with them. In this chapter, I thus review work in 'traditional fields' (such as memory, perception and action, language and thought, consciousness and agency) that attests to the power of research on extended cognition but also investigate three major recent developments (internet, social cognition, and music) that promise to highlight points of progress that are not easily revealed by the kind of cases that animate the majority of philosophical discussions in this area. I suggest that these latter developments can help move the field forward in important and unexpected ways and conclude by arguing that it is a mere prejudice to suppose that all cognition must take place within the confines of the organism's skin and skull.

Section 2: Cognitive and Neuroscience Perspectives

Many of the key developments in embodiment have occurred within cognitive psychology and within the allied area of cognitive neuroscience (Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg, Witt, & Metcalfe, 2013). Accordingly, cognitive and neuroscience perspectives will figure prominently in the second section of the present volume. In addition, the section tackles key questions concerning how it is that human beings can use their bodily experiences to ground abstract concepts, the role of bodily experiences in evaluations of the environment, and the manner in which intentions, goals, and tasks become coordinated with what we see and do as bodily beings.

Chapter 7: Measuring the Mathematical Mind: Embodied Evidence from Negative Numbers, Calculation Biases, Motor Resonance, and Emotional Priming

Contact Author: Martin A. Fischer ([...]), University of Potsdam, Germany

The embodied perspective on human cognition opposes the view of the human mind as a computer. It is thus particularly diagnostic to assess how the body contributes to numerical cognition. We review how associations between numbers and space influence many tasks and even negative number comprehension. Grounded, embodied and situated learning experiences impose systematic heuristics and biases on mental arithmetic and engage our motor system during number processing. Finally, we document how emotional processing interacts with simple calculations, thus supporting an embodied understanding of the mathematical mind.

Chapter 8: The Challenge of Abstract Concepts

Contact Author: Guy Dove [...] University of Louisville, USA

In this chapter, I will argue that abstract concepts are heterogeneous and pose several distinct challenges for embodied cognition. I will survey evidence supporting this heterogeneity and critically review possible theoretical means of addressing these challenges.

Chapter 9: Abstract Concepts and Social Metacognition: Sociality from the Inside?

Contact Author: Anna M. Borghi (anna.[...]), Sapienza University of Rome, Italy

Other Authors (If Known): Chiara Fini and Luca Tummolini

We have recently proposed that metacognition - the set of capacities through which an operating subsystem is evaluated...