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Provides a timely and original contribution to the debate surrounding privileged self-knowledge
Contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of mind continue to find puzzling the nature and source of privileged self-knowledge: the ordinary and effortless 'first-person' knowledge we have of our own sensations, moods, emotions, beliefs, desires, and hopes.
In Expression and Self-Knowledge, Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright articulate their joint dissatisfaction with extant accounts of self-knowledge and engage in a sustained and substantial critical debate over the merits of an expressivist approach to the topic. The authors incorporate cutting-edge research while defending their own alternatives to existing approaches to so-called 'first-person privilege'.
Bar-On defends her neo-expressivist account, addressing the objection that neo-expressivism fails to provide an adequate epistemology of ordinary self-knowledge, and addresses new objections levelled by Wright. Wright then presents an alternative pluralist approach, and Bar-On argues in response that pluralism faces difficulties neo-expressivism avoids. Providing invaluable insights on a hotly debated topic in epistemology and philosophy of mind, Expression and Self-Knowledge:
* Presents an in-depth debate between two leading philosophers over the expressivist approach
* Offers novel developments and penetrating criticisms of the authors' respective views
* Features two different perspectives on the influential remarks on expression and self-knowledge found in Wittgenstein's later writings
* Includes four jointly written chapters that offer a critical overview of prominent existing accounts, which provide a useful advanced introduction to the subject.
Expression and Self-Knowledge is essential reading for epistemologists, philosophers of mind and language, psychologists with an interest in self-knowledge, and researchers and graduate students working in expression, expressivism, and self-knowledge.
Contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of mind continue to find puzzling the nature and source of privileged self-knowledge: the ordinary and effortless 'first-person' knowledge we have of our own sensations, moods, emotions, beliefs, desires, and hopes.
In Expression and Self-Knowledge, Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright articulate their joint dissatisfaction with extant accounts of self-knowledge and engage in a sustained and substantial critical debate over the merits of an expressivist approach to the topic. The authors incorporate cutting-edge research while defending their own alternatives to existing approaches to so-called 'first-person privilege'.
Bar-On defends her neo-expressivist account, addressing the objection that neo-expressivism fails to provide an adequate epistemology of ordinary self-knowledge, and addresses new objections levelled by Wright. Wright then presents an alternative pluralist approach, and Bar-On argues in response that pluralism faces difficulties neo-expressivism avoids. Providing invaluable insights on a hotly debated topic in epistemology and philosophy of mind, Expression and Self-Knowledge:
* Presents an in-depth debate between two leading philosophers over the expressivist approach
* Offers novel developments and penetrating criticisms of the authors' respective views
* Features two different perspectives on the influential remarks on expression and self-knowledge found in Wittgenstein's later writings
* Includes four jointly written chapters that offer a critical overview of prominent existing accounts, which provide a useful advanced introduction to the subject.
Expression and Self-Knowledge is essential reading for epistemologists, philosophers of mind and language, psychologists with an interest in self-knowledge, and researchers and graduate students working in expression, expressivism, and self-knowledge.
Provides a timely and original contribution to the debate surrounding privileged self-knowledge
Contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of mind continue to find puzzling the nature and source of privileged self-knowledge: the ordinary and effortless 'first-person' knowledge we have of our own sensations, moods, emotions, beliefs, desires, and hopes.
In Expression and Self-Knowledge, Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright articulate their joint dissatisfaction with extant accounts of self-knowledge and engage in a sustained and substantial critical debate over the merits of an expressivist approach to the topic. The authors incorporate cutting-edge research while defending their own alternatives to existing approaches to so-called 'first-person privilege'.
Bar-On defends her neo-expressivist account, addressing the objection that neo-expressivism fails to provide an adequate epistemology of ordinary self-knowledge, and addresses new objections levelled by Wright. Wright then presents an alternative pluralist approach, and Bar-On argues in response that pluralism faces difficulties neo-expressivism avoids. Providing invaluable insights on a hotly debated topic in epistemology and philosophy of mind, Expression and Self-Knowledge:
* Presents an in-depth debate between two leading philosophers over the expressivist approach
* Offers novel developments and penetrating criticisms of the authors' respective views
* Features two different perspectives on the influential remarks on expression and self-knowledge found in Wittgenstein's later writings
* Includes four jointly written chapters that offer a critical overview of prominent existing accounts, which provide a useful advanced introduction to the subject.
Expression and Self-Knowledge is essential reading for epistemologists, philosophers of mind and language, psychologists with an interest in self-knowledge, and researchers and graduate students working in expression, expressivism, and self-knowledge.
Contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of mind continue to find puzzling the nature and source of privileged self-knowledge: the ordinary and effortless 'first-person' knowledge we have of our own sensations, moods, emotions, beliefs, desires, and hopes.
In Expression and Self-Knowledge, Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright articulate their joint dissatisfaction with extant accounts of self-knowledge and engage in a sustained and substantial critical debate over the merits of an expressivist approach to the topic. The authors incorporate cutting-edge research while defending their own alternatives to existing approaches to so-called 'first-person privilege'.
Bar-On defends her neo-expressivist account, addressing the objection that neo-expressivism fails to provide an adequate epistemology of ordinary self-knowledge, and addresses new objections levelled by Wright. Wright then presents an alternative pluralist approach, and Bar-On argues in response that pluralism faces difficulties neo-expressivism avoids. Providing invaluable insights on a hotly debated topic in epistemology and philosophy of mind, Expression and Self-Knowledge:
* Presents an in-depth debate between two leading philosophers over the expressivist approach
* Offers novel developments and penetrating criticisms of the authors' respective views
* Features two different perspectives on the influential remarks on expression and self-knowledge found in Wittgenstein's later writings
* Includes four jointly written chapters that offer a critical overview of prominent existing accounts, which provide a useful advanced introduction to the subject.
Expression and Self-Knowledge is essential reading for epistemologists, philosophers of mind and language, psychologists with an interest in self-knowledge, and researchers and graduate students working in expression, expressivism, and self-knowledge.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Preface and Acknowledgments ix
1 Privileged Access 1
Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright
1.1 Privileged Access: What Is the Problem? 1
1.2 The Cartesian "Solution" 3
1.3 Language First or Thought First? 7
2 Skepticism about the Problem 11
Crispin Wright
2.1 Rejecting the Entire Explanatory Project: Wittgenstein and the "Default View" 12
2.2 Disputing the "Data" 18
2.2.1 Snowdon 18
2.2.2 Schwitzgebel 25
2.2.3 Carruthers 31
2.2.4 Williamson 39
3 A Critique of Some Recent Accounts of First-Person Privilege: Part I: Epistemic Approaches 43
Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright
3.1 Epistemic Approaches 44
3.2 Epistemic Access as "Inward Gaze": Non-Cartesian Conceptions of Inner Sense 45
3.2.1 Materialist Introspectionism 45
3.2.2 Against an Expertise Model of First-Person Privilege 48
3.3 Privileged Access as Outer Gaze: Transparency Views 51
3.3.1 Gareth Evans: Transparency as an Epistemic Procedure 51
3.3.2 Five Limitations of Transparency as an Epistemic Procedure 53
3.3.3 Alex Byrne: Transparent Inference Rules 58
3.4 Christopher Peacocke on Self-Knowledge of Belief 64
4 A Critique of Some Recent Accounts of First-Person Privilege: Part II: "High-Road" Approaches to Self-Knowledge 73
Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright
4.1 Avowals as Expressive of Commitments: Moran and Bilgrami 74
4.2 Against Commissive Views 78
4.3 The Uniformity Constraint 82
4.4 Tyler Burge on Self-Knowledge and Critical Reasoning 86
4.5 Metaphysical Constitutivism: Resoluteness and Shoemaker 92
4.6 Conceptual Constitutivism: Wright and Judgment-Dependence 96
4.7 Privileged Access: Diagnosis and Desiderata 100
5 Some Initial Thoughts about Expressivist Responses to the Problem 103
Crispin Wright
5.1 Psychological Expressivism: Simple and Radical 103
5.2 Radical Expressivism: Some Serious Misgivings 107
6 Neo-Expressivism: Speaking One's Mind 110
Dorit Bar-On
6.1 Avowals' Distinctive Security and Basic Self-Knowledge: A Brief Overview 111
6.1.1 Basic Self-Knowledge: Some Theses, Some Questions 111
6.1.2 "Language-first" Vs. "Thought-first" 113
6.1.3 Avowals' Security: The Explanatory Task 115
6.2 Expressivism: Simple, Radical, and New 116
6.2.1 Simple Expressivism 117
6.2.2 "Radical" Expressivism 120
6.3 The Neo-Expressivist Account of Avowals' Distinctive Security 124
6.3.1 Avowals: Acts, Products, Vehicles 124
6.3.2 Neo-Expressivism: Explaining Avowals' Distinctive Security 128
6.3.3 Avowals' Security: Immunity to Error 130
6.3.4 Dual Immunity to Error and the Expressive Character of Avowals 137
6.3.5 False Avowals, Transparency, and Moore's Paradox 139
7 Neo-Expressivism: Knowing One's Mind 144
Dorit Bar-On
7.1 Neo-Expressivism and Self-Knowledge 145
7.2 Expression and No-"How" Basic Self-Knowledge 146
7.2.1 "Baseless" Self-Knowledge: Warrant, Entitlement, and Grounding 147
7.2.2 The Dual Immunity to Error of Avowals and Avowals' Default Entitlement 149
7.2.3 Avowals as Warranted: Baseless yet Grounded? 151
7.3 Basic Self-Knowledge Without Avowals? 154
7.3.1 The Objection from Unavowed Self-Knowledge 155
7.3.2 Implicit Self-Knowledge and the "Episodic Constraint" 156
7.3.3 Is Avowing Necessary for Possessing Actual Self-Knowledge? 163
7.4 Neo-Expressivism: "Grammar," Epist
1 Privileged Access 1
Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright
1.1 Privileged Access: What Is the Problem? 1
1.2 The Cartesian "Solution" 3
1.3 Language First or Thought First? 7
2 Skepticism about the Problem 11
Crispin Wright
2.1 Rejecting the Entire Explanatory Project: Wittgenstein and the "Default View" 12
2.2 Disputing the "Data" 18
2.2.1 Snowdon 18
2.2.2 Schwitzgebel 25
2.2.3 Carruthers 31
2.2.4 Williamson 39
3 A Critique of Some Recent Accounts of First-Person Privilege: Part I: Epistemic Approaches 43
Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright
3.1 Epistemic Approaches 44
3.2 Epistemic Access as "Inward Gaze": Non-Cartesian Conceptions of Inner Sense 45
3.2.1 Materialist Introspectionism 45
3.2.2 Against an Expertise Model of First-Person Privilege 48
3.3 Privileged Access as Outer Gaze: Transparency Views 51
3.3.1 Gareth Evans: Transparency as an Epistemic Procedure 51
3.3.2 Five Limitations of Transparency as an Epistemic Procedure 53
3.3.3 Alex Byrne: Transparent Inference Rules 58
3.4 Christopher Peacocke on Self-Knowledge of Belief 64
4 A Critique of Some Recent Accounts of First-Person Privilege: Part II: "High-Road" Approaches to Self-Knowledge 73
Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright
4.1 Avowals as Expressive of Commitments: Moran and Bilgrami 74
4.2 Against Commissive Views 78
4.3 The Uniformity Constraint 82
4.4 Tyler Burge on Self-Knowledge and Critical Reasoning 86
4.5 Metaphysical Constitutivism: Resoluteness and Shoemaker 92
4.6 Conceptual Constitutivism: Wright and Judgment-Dependence 96
4.7 Privileged Access: Diagnosis and Desiderata 100
5 Some Initial Thoughts about Expressivist Responses to the Problem 103
Crispin Wright
5.1 Psychological Expressivism: Simple and Radical 103
5.2 Radical Expressivism: Some Serious Misgivings 107
6 Neo-Expressivism: Speaking One's Mind 110
Dorit Bar-On
6.1 Avowals' Distinctive Security and Basic Self-Knowledge: A Brief Overview 111
6.1.1 Basic Self-Knowledge: Some Theses, Some Questions 111
6.1.2 "Language-first" Vs. "Thought-first" 113
6.1.3 Avowals' Security: The Explanatory Task 115
6.2 Expressivism: Simple, Radical, and New 116
6.2.1 Simple Expressivism 117
6.2.2 "Radical" Expressivism 120
6.3 The Neo-Expressivist Account of Avowals' Distinctive Security 124
6.3.1 Avowals: Acts, Products, Vehicles 124
6.3.2 Neo-Expressivism: Explaining Avowals' Distinctive Security 128
6.3.3 Avowals' Security: Immunity to Error 130
6.3.4 Dual Immunity to Error and the Expressive Character of Avowals 137
6.3.5 False Avowals, Transparency, and Moore's Paradox 139
7 Neo-Expressivism: Knowing One's Mind 144
Dorit Bar-On
7.1 Neo-Expressivism and Self-Knowledge 145
7.2 Expression and No-"How" Basic Self-Knowledge 146
7.2.1 "Baseless" Self-Knowledge: Warrant, Entitlement, and Grounding 147
7.2.2 The Dual Immunity to Error of Avowals and Avowals' Default Entitlement 149
7.2.3 Avowals as Warranted: Baseless yet Grounded? 151
7.3 Basic Self-Knowledge Without Avowals? 154
7.3.1 The Objection from Unavowed Self-Knowledge 155
7.3.2 Implicit Self-Knowledge and the "Episodic Constraint" 156
7.3.3 Is Avowing Necessary for Possessing Actual Self-Knowledge? 163
7.4 Neo-Expressivism: "Grammar," Epist
Details
| Erscheinungsjahr: | 2023 |
|---|---|
| Genre: | Philosophie |
| Rubrik: | Geisteswissenschaften |
| Medium: | Taschenbuch |
| Inhalt: | 368 S. |
| ISBN-13: | 9781118908471 |
| ISBN-10: | 1118908473 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Herstellernummer: | 1W118908470 |
| Autor: |
Bar-On, Dorit
Wright, Crispin |
| Auflage: | 1. Auflage |
| Hersteller: |
Wiley & Sons
Wiley-Blackwell |
| Maße: | 229 x 152 x 34 mm |
| Von/Mit: | Dorit Bar-On (u. a.) |
| Erscheinungsdatum: | 12.10.2023 |
| Gewicht: | 0,552 kg |
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Preface and Acknowledgments ix
1 Privileged Access 1
Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright
1.1 Privileged Access: What Is the Problem? 1
1.2 The Cartesian "Solution" 3
1.3 Language First or Thought First? 7
2 Skepticism about the Problem 11
Crispin Wright
2.1 Rejecting the Entire Explanatory Project: Wittgenstein and the "Default View" 12
2.2 Disputing the "Data" 18
2.2.1 Snowdon 18
2.2.2 Schwitzgebel 25
2.2.3 Carruthers 31
2.2.4 Williamson 39
3 A Critique of Some Recent Accounts of First-Person Privilege: Part I: Epistemic Approaches 43
Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright
3.1 Epistemic Approaches 44
3.2 Epistemic Access as "Inward Gaze": Non-Cartesian Conceptions of Inner Sense 45
3.2.1 Materialist Introspectionism 45
3.2.2 Against an Expertise Model of First-Person Privilege 48
3.3 Privileged Access as Outer Gaze: Transparency Views 51
3.3.1 Gareth Evans: Transparency as an Epistemic Procedure 51
3.3.2 Five Limitations of Transparency as an Epistemic Procedure 53
3.3.3 Alex Byrne: Transparent Inference Rules 58
3.4 Christopher Peacocke on Self-Knowledge of Belief 64
4 A Critique of Some Recent Accounts of First-Person Privilege: Part II: "High-Road" Approaches to Self-Knowledge 73
Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright
4.1 Avowals as Expressive of Commitments: Moran and Bilgrami 74
4.2 Against Commissive Views 78
4.3 The Uniformity Constraint 82
4.4 Tyler Burge on Self-Knowledge and Critical Reasoning 86
4.5 Metaphysical Constitutivism: Resoluteness and Shoemaker 92
4.6 Conceptual Constitutivism: Wright and Judgment-Dependence 96
4.7 Privileged Access: Diagnosis and Desiderata 100
5 Some Initial Thoughts about Expressivist Responses to the Problem 103
Crispin Wright
5.1 Psychological Expressivism: Simple and Radical 103
5.2 Radical Expressivism: Some Serious Misgivings 107
6 Neo-Expressivism: Speaking One's Mind 110
Dorit Bar-On
6.1 Avowals' Distinctive Security and Basic Self-Knowledge: A Brief Overview 111
6.1.1 Basic Self-Knowledge: Some Theses, Some Questions 111
6.1.2 "Language-first" Vs. "Thought-first" 113
6.1.3 Avowals' Security: The Explanatory Task 115
6.2 Expressivism: Simple, Radical, and New 116
6.2.1 Simple Expressivism 117
6.2.2 "Radical" Expressivism 120
6.3 The Neo-Expressivist Account of Avowals' Distinctive Security 124
6.3.1 Avowals: Acts, Products, Vehicles 124
6.3.2 Neo-Expressivism: Explaining Avowals' Distinctive Security 128
6.3.3 Avowals' Security: Immunity to Error 130
6.3.4 Dual Immunity to Error and the Expressive Character of Avowals 137
6.3.5 False Avowals, Transparency, and Moore's Paradox 139
7 Neo-Expressivism: Knowing One's Mind 144
Dorit Bar-On
7.1 Neo-Expressivism and Self-Knowledge 145
7.2 Expression and No-"How" Basic Self-Knowledge 146
7.2.1 "Baseless" Self-Knowledge: Warrant, Entitlement, and Grounding 147
7.2.2 The Dual Immunity to Error of Avowals and Avowals' Default Entitlement 149
7.2.3 Avowals as Warranted: Baseless yet Grounded? 151
7.3 Basic Self-Knowledge Without Avowals? 154
7.3.1 The Objection from Unavowed Self-Knowledge 155
7.3.2 Implicit Self-Knowledge and the "Episodic Constraint" 156
7.3.3 Is Avowing Necessary for Possessing Actual Self-Knowledge? 163
7.4 Neo-Expressivism: "Grammar," Epist
1 Privileged Access 1
Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright
1.1 Privileged Access: What Is the Problem? 1
1.2 The Cartesian "Solution" 3
1.3 Language First or Thought First? 7
2 Skepticism about the Problem 11
Crispin Wright
2.1 Rejecting the Entire Explanatory Project: Wittgenstein and the "Default View" 12
2.2 Disputing the "Data" 18
2.2.1 Snowdon 18
2.2.2 Schwitzgebel 25
2.2.3 Carruthers 31
2.2.4 Williamson 39
3 A Critique of Some Recent Accounts of First-Person Privilege: Part I: Epistemic Approaches 43
Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright
3.1 Epistemic Approaches 44
3.2 Epistemic Access as "Inward Gaze": Non-Cartesian Conceptions of Inner Sense 45
3.2.1 Materialist Introspectionism 45
3.2.2 Against an Expertise Model of First-Person Privilege 48
3.3 Privileged Access as Outer Gaze: Transparency Views 51
3.3.1 Gareth Evans: Transparency as an Epistemic Procedure 51
3.3.2 Five Limitations of Transparency as an Epistemic Procedure 53
3.3.3 Alex Byrne: Transparent Inference Rules 58
3.4 Christopher Peacocke on Self-Knowledge of Belief 64
4 A Critique of Some Recent Accounts of First-Person Privilege: Part II: "High-Road" Approaches to Self-Knowledge 73
Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright
4.1 Avowals as Expressive of Commitments: Moran and Bilgrami 74
4.2 Against Commissive Views 78
4.3 The Uniformity Constraint 82
4.4 Tyler Burge on Self-Knowledge and Critical Reasoning 86
4.5 Metaphysical Constitutivism: Resoluteness and Shoemaker 92
4.6 Conceptual Constitutivism: Wright and Judgment-Dependence 96
4.7 Privileged Access: Diagnosis and Desiderata 100
5 Some Initial Thoughts about Expressivist Responses to the Problem 103
Crispin Wright
5.1 Psychological Expressivism: Simple and Radical 103
5.2 Radical Expressivism: Some Serious Misgivings 107
6 Neo-Expressivism: Speaking One's Mind 110
Dorit Bar-On
6.1 Avowals' Distinctive Security and Basic Self-Knowledge: A Brief Overview 111
6.1.1 Basic Self-Knowledge: Some Theses, Some Questions 111
6.1.2 "Language-first" Vs. "Thought-first" 113
6.1.3 Avowals' Security: The Explanatory Task 115
6.2 Expressivism: Simple, Radical, and New 116
6.2.1 Simple Expressivism 117
6.2.2 "Radical" Expressivism 120
6.3 The Neo-Expressivist Account of Avowals' Distinctive Security 124
6.3.1 Avowals: Acts, Products, Vehicles 124
6.3.2 Neo-Expressivism: Explaining Avowals' Distinctive Security 128
6.3.3 Avowals' Security: Immunity to Error 130
6.3.4 Dual Immunity to Error and the Expressive Character of Avowals 137
6.3.5 False Avowals, Transparency, and Moore's Paradox 139
7 Neo-Expressivism: Knowing One's Mind 144
Dorit Bar-On
7.1 Neo-Expressivism and Self-Knowledge 145
7.2 Expression and No-"How" Basic Self-Knowledge 146
7.2.1 "Baseless" Self-Knowledge: Warrant, Entitlement, and Grounding 147
7.2.2 The Dual Immunity to Error of Avowals and Avowals' Default Entitlement 149
7.2.3 Avowals as Warranted: Baseless yet Grounded? 151
7.3 Basic Self-Knowledge Without Avowals? 154
7.3.1 The Objection from Unavowed Self-Knowledge 155
7.3.2 Implicit Self-Knowledge and the "Episodic Constraint" 156
7.3.3 Is Avowing Necessary for Possessing Actual Self-Knowledge? 163
7.4 Neo-Expressivism: "Grammar," Epist
Details
| Erscheinungsjahr: | 2023 |
|---|---|
| Genre: | Philosophie |
| Rubrik: | Geisteswissenschaften |
| Medium: | Taschenbuch |
| Inhalt: | 368 S. |
| ISBN-13: | 9781118908471 |
| ISBN-10: | 1118908473 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Herstellernummer: | 1W118908470 |
| Autor: |
Bar-On, Dorit
Wright, Crispin |
| Auflage: | 1. Auflage |
| Hersteller: |
Wiley & Sons
Wiley-Blackwell |
| Maße: | 229 x 152 x 34 mm |
| Von/Mit: | Dorit Bar-On (u. a.) |
| Erscheinungsdatum: | 12.10.2023 |
| Gewicht: | 0,552 kg |
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