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Beschreibung
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both perform those acts voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. In Who Knew? George Sher seeks to rectify that imbalance. The book is divided in two halves, the first of which criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition, while the second seeks to develop a more adequate alternative. It is often assumed that agents are responsible only for what they are aware of doing or bringing about--that their responsibility extends only as far as the searchlight of their consciousness. The book criticizes this "searchlight view" on two main grounds: first, that it is inconsistent with our attributions of responsibility to a broad range of agents who should but do not realize that they are acting wrongly or foolishly, and, second, that the view is not independently defensible.
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both perform those acts voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. In Who Knew? George Sher seeks to rectify that imbalance. The book is divided in two halves, the first of which criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition, while the second seeks to develop a more adequate alternative. It is often assumed that agents are responsible only for what they are aware of doing or bringing about--that their responsibility extends only as far as the searchlight of their consciousness. The book criticizes this "searchlight view" on two main grounds: first, that it is inconsistent with our attributions of responsibility to a broad range of agents who should but do not realize that they are acting wrongly or foolishly, and, second, that the view is not independently defensible.
Über den Autor
George Sher is Herber S. Autrey Professor of Philosophy at Rice University.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • Acknowledgements

  • 1: The Searchlight View

  • 2: Responsibility Without Awareness

  • 3: Responsibility and Practical Reason

  • 4: Kantian Fairness

  • 5: Knew--Or Should Have Known?

  • 6: A New Beginning

  • 7: Setting the Norms of Recognition

  • 8: The Responsible Self

  • 9: Out of Control

  • Index

Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2009
Fachbereich: Allgemeines
Genre: Importe, Philosophie
Jahrhundert: Antike
Rubrik: Geisteswissenschaften
Thema: Lexika
Medium: Taschenbuch
Inhalt: Kartoniert / Broschiert
ISBN-13: 9780195389203
ISBN-10: 0195389204
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Sher, George
Hersteller: Oxford University Press
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße: 216 x 140 x 9 mm
Von/Mit: George Sher
Erscheinungsdatum: 13.08.2009
Gewicht: 0,218 kg
Artikel-ID: 120659337

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