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Beschreibung
This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences.

This sixtieth anniversary edition includes not only the original text but also an introduction by Harold Kuhn, an afterword by Ariel Rubinstein, and reviews and articles on the book that appeared at the time of its original publication in the New York Times, tthe American Economic Review, and a variety of other publications. Together, these writings provide readers a matchless opportunity to more fully appreciate a work whose influence will yet resound for generations to come.
This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences.

This sixtieth anniversary edition includes not only the original text but also an introduction by Harold Kuhn, an afterword by Ariel Rubinstein, and reviews and articles on the book that appeared at the time of its original publication in the New York Times, tthe American Economic Review, and a variety of other publications. Together, these writings provide readers a matchless opportunity to more fully appreciate a work whose influence will yet resound for generations to come.
Über den Autor
John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern
With an introduction by Harold Kuhn and an afterword by Ariel Rubinstein
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • PREFACE
  • TECHNICAL NOTE
  • ACKNOWLEDGMENT
  • CHAPTER I
  • FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM
  • 1. THE MATHEMATICAL METHOD IN ECONOMICS
    • 1.1. Introductory remarks
    • 1.2. Difficulties of the application of the mathematical method
    • 1.3. Necessary limitations of the objectives
    • 1.4. Concluding remarks
  • 2. QUALITATIVE DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR
    • 2.1. The problem of rational behavior
    • 2.2. “Robinson Crusoe” economy and social exchange economy
    • 2.3. The number of variables and the number of participants
    • 2.4. The case of many participants: Free competition
    • 2.5. The “Lausanne” theory
  • 3. THE NOTION OF UTILITY
    • 3.1. Preferences and utilities
    • 3.2. Principles of measurement: Preliminaries
    • 3.3. Probability and numerical utilities
    • 3.4. Principles of measurement: Detailed discussion
    • 3.5. Conceptual structure of the axiomatic treatment of numerical utilities
    • 3.6. The axioms and their interpretation
    • 3.7. General remarks concerning the axioms
    • 3.8. The role of the concept of marginal utility
  • 4. STRUCTURE OF THE THEORY: SOLUTIONS AND STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOR
    • 4.1. The simplest concept of a solution for one participant
    • 4.2. Extension to all participants
    • 4.3. The solution as a set of imputations
    • 4.4. The intransitive notion of “superiority” or “domination”
    • 4.5. The precise definition of a solution
    • 4.6. Interpretation of our definition in terms of “standards of behavior”
    • 4.7. Games and social organizations
    • 4.8. Concluding remarks
  • CHAPTER II
  • GENERAL FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF GAMES OF STRATEGY
  • 5. INTRODUCTION
    • 5.1. Shift of emphasis from economics to games
    • 5.2. General principles of classification and of procedure
  • 6. THE SIMPLIFIED CONCEPT OF A GAME
    • 6.1. Explanation of the termini technici
    • 6.2. The elements of the game
    • 6.3. Information and preliminary
    • 6.4. Preliminarity, transitivity, and signaling
  • 7. THE COMPLETE CONCEPT OF A GAME
    • 7.1. Variability of the characteristics of each move
    • 7.2. The general description
  • 8. SETS AND PARTITIONS
    • 8.1. Desirability of a set-theoretical description of a game
    • 8.2. Sets, their properties, and their graphical representation
    • 8.3. Partitions, their properties, and their graphical representation
    • 8.4. Logistic interpretation of sets and partitions
  • *9. THE SET-THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION OF A GAME
    • *9.1. The partitions which describe a game
    • *9.2. Discussion of these partitions and their properties
  • *10. AXIOMATIC FORMULATION
    • *10.1. The axioms and their interpretations
    • *10.2. Logistic discussion of the axioms
    • *10.3. General remarks concerning the axioms
    • *10.4. Graphical representation
  • 11. STRATEGIES AND THE FINAL SIMPLIFICATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OF A GAME
    • 11.1. The concept of a strategy and its formalization
    • 11.2. The final simplification of the description of a game
    • 11.3. The role of strategies in the simplified form of a game
    • 11.4. The meaning of the zero-sum restriction
  • CHAPTER III
  • ZERO-SUM TWO-PERSON GAMES: THEORY
  • 12. PRELIMINARY SURVEY
    • 12.1. General viewpoints
    • 12.2. The one-person game
    • 12.3. Chance and probability
    • 12.4. The next objective
  • 13. FUNCTIONAL CALCULUS
    • 13.1. Basic definitions
    • 13.2. The operations Max and Min
    • 13.3 Commutativity questions
    • 13.4. The mixed case. Saddle points
    • 13.5. Proofs of the main facts
  • 14. STRICTLY DETERMINED GAMES
    • 14 1. Formulation of the problem
    • 14.2. The minorant and the majorant games
    • 14.3. Discussion of the auxiliary games
    • 14.4. Conclusions
    • 14.5. Analysis of strict determinateness
    • 14.6. The interchange of players. Symmetry
    • 14.7. Non strictly determined games
    • 14.8. Program of a detailed analysis of strict determinateness
  • *15. GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION
    • *15.1. Statement of purpose. Induction
    • *15.2. The exact condition (First step)
    • *15.3. The exact condition (Entire induction)
    • *15.4. Exact discussion of the inductive step
    • *15.5. Exact discussion of the inductive step (Continuation)
    • *15.6. The result in the case of perfect information
    • *15.7. Application to Chess
    • *15.8. The alternative, verbal discussion
  • 16. LINEARITY AND CONVEXITY
    • 16.1. Geometrical background
    • 16.2. Vector operations
    • 16.3. The theorem of the supporting hyperplanes
    • 16.4. The theorem of the alternative for matrices
  • 17. MIXED STRATEGIES. THE SOLUTION FOR ALL GAMES
    • 17.1. Discussion of two elementary examples
    • 17.2. Generalization of this viewpoint
    • 17.3. Justification of the procedure as applied to an individual play
    • 17.4. The minorant and the majorant games. (For mixed strategies)
    • 17.5. General strict determinateness
    • 17.6. Proof of the main theorem
    • 17.7. Comparison of the treatment by pure and by mixed strategies
    • 17.8. Analysis of general strict determinateness
    • 17.9. Further characteristics of good strategies
    • 17.10. Mistakes and their consequences. Permanent optimality
    • 17.11. The interchange of players. Symmetry
  • CHAPTER IV
  • ZERO-SUM TWO-PERSON GAMES: EXAMPLES
  • 18. SOME ELEMENTARY GAMES
    • 18.1. The simplest games
    • 18.2. Detailed quantitative discussion of these games
    • 18.3. Qualitative characterizations
    • 18.4. Discussion of some specific games. (Generalized forms of Matching Pennies)
    • 18.5. Discussion of some slightly more complicated games
    • 18.6. Chance and imperfect information
    • 18.7. Interpretation of this result
  • *19. POKER AND BLUFFING
    • *19.1. Description of Poker
    • *19.2. Bluffing
    • *19.3. Description of Poker (Continued)
    • *19.4. Exact formulation of the rules
    • *19.5. Description of the strategy
    • *19.6. Statement of the problem
    • *19.7. Passage from the discrete to the continuous problem
    • *19.8. Mathematical determination of the solution
    • *19.9. Detailed analysis of the solution
    • *19.10. Interpretation of the solution
    • *19.11. More general forms of Poker
    • *19.12. Discrete hands
    • *19.13. m possible bids
    • *19.14. Alternate bidding
    • *19.15. Mathematical description of all solutions
    • *19.16. Interpretation of the solutions. Conclusions
  • CHAPTER V
  • ZERO-SUM THREE-PERSON GAMES
  • 20. PRELIMINARY SURVEY
    • 20.1. General viewpoints
    • 20.2. Coalitions
  • 21. THE SIMPLE MAJORITY GAME OF THREE PERSONS
    • 21.1. Definition of the game
    • 21.2. Analysis of the game: Necessity of “understandings”
    • 21.3. Analysis of the game: Coalitions. The role of symmetry
  • 22. FURTHER EXAMPLES
    • 22.1. Unsymmetric distributions. Necessity of compensations
    • 22.2. Coalitions of different strength. Discussion
    • 22.3. An inequality. Formulae
  • 23. THE GENERAL CASE
    • 23.1. Detailed discussion. Inessential and essential games
    • 23.2. Complete formulae
  • 24. DISCUSSION OF AN OBJECTION
    • 24.1. The case of perfect information and its significance
    • 24.2. Detailed discussion. Necessity of compensations between three or more players
  • CHAPTER VI
  • FORMULATION OF THE GENERAL THEORY: ZERO-SUM n-PERSON GAMES
  • 25. THE CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION
    • 25.1. Motivation and definition
    • 25.2. Discussion of the concept
    • 25.3. Fundamental properties
    • 25.4. Immediate mathematical consequences
  • 26. CONSTRUCTION OF A GAME WITH A GIVEN CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION
    • 26.1. The construction
    • 26.2. Summary
  • 27. STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE. INESSENTIAL AND ESSENTIAL GAMES
    • 27.1. Strategic equivalence. The reduced form
    • 27.2. Inequalities. The quantity γ
    • 27.3. Inessentiality and essentiality
    • 27.4. Various criteria. Non additive utilities
    • 27.5. The inequalities in the essential case
    • 27.6. Vector operations on characteristic functions
  • 28. GROUPS, SYMMETRY AND FAIRNESS
    • 28.1. Permutations, their groups and their effect on a game
    • 28.2. Symmetry and fairness
  • 29. RECONSIDERATION OF THE ZERO-SUM THREE-PERSON GAME
    • 29.1. Qualitative discussion
    • 29.2. Quantitative discussion
  • 30. THE EXACT FORM OF THE GENERAL DEFINITIONS
    • 30.1. The definitions
    • 30.2. Discussion and recapitulation
    • *30.3. The concept of saturation
    • 30.4. Three immediate objectives
  • 31. FIRST CONSEQUENCES
    • 31.1. Convexity, flatness, and some criteria for domination
    • 31.2. The system of all imputations. One element solutions
    • 31.3. The isomorphism which corresponds to strategic equivalence
  • 32. DETERMINATION OF ALL SOLUTIONS OF THE ESSENTIAL ZERO-SUM THREE-PERSON GAME
    • 32.1. Formulation of the mathematical problem. The graphical method
    • 32.2. Determination of all solutions
  • 33. CONCLUSIONS
    • 33.1. The multiplicity of solutions. Discrimination and its meaning
    • 33.2. Statics and dynamics
  • CHAPTER VII
  • ZERO-SUM FOUR-PERSON GAMES
  • 34. PRELIMINARY...
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2009
Fachbereich: Allgemeines
Genre: Importe, Wirtschaft
Rubrik: Recht & Wirtschaft
Medium: Taschenbuch
Inhalt: Einband - flex.(Paperback)
ISBN-13: 9780691130613
ISBN-10: 0691130612
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Neumann, John Von
Morgenstern, Oskar
Hersteller: Princeton University Press
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße: 234 x 156 x 45 mm
Von/Mit: John Von Neumann (u. a.)
Erscheinungsdatum: 16.10.2009
Gewicht: 1,298 kg
Artikel-ID: 102080110

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