Dietrich Heinrich von Bülow (1757-1807) served for sixteen years in the Prussian army, but for the remainder of his life lived a varied existence as a theatrical manager, preacher, writer, businessman, debtor and finally prisoner. It was not until after his death that this work, written in 1799 and reissued here in its 1806 English translation, began to find favour. He advocates the use of mathematical principles in devising swift and decisive tactics, and was one of the first theoreticians to regard tactics and strategy as separate concerns. At a time when Germany and Italy were yet to be unified, he writes that expansion to 'optimum' size would result in a Europe of only twelve states. The book's theories were criticised by Napoleon and Clausewitz, but had a considerable influence on the Prussian and Austrian armies of the late nineteenth century, and it is regarded as one of the founding texts of modern geopolitics.
Dietrich Heinrich von Bülow (1757-1807) served for sixteen years in the Prussian army, but for the remainder of his life lived a varied existence as a theatrical manager, preacher, writer, businessman, debtor and finally prisoner. It was not until after his death that this work, written in 1799 and reissued here in its 1806 English translation, began to find favour. He advocates the use of mathematical principles in devising swift and decisive tactics, and was one of the first theoreticians to regard tactics and strategy as separate concerns. At a time when Germany and Italy were yet to be unified, he writes that expansion to 'optimum' size would result in a Europe of only twelve states. The book's theories were criticised by Napoleon and Clausewitz, but had a considerable influence on the Prussian and Austrian armies of the late nineteenth century, and it is regarded as one of the founding texts of modern geopolitics.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Commentator's preface; Part I. A View of the Principle on Which the Modern System of War Is Founded: 1. General notions; 2. Of lines of operation; 3. Of diverging lines of operation; 4. Of parallel lines of operation; 5. Of lines of operation; 6. Of the most advantageous form and direction of a base; 7. Of retreats within the base; 8. Of parallel and eccentric retreats; 9. Of the result of all the foregoing inquiries; 10. The difference between strategics and tactics; 11. Of the order of battle; 12. Of the Chevalier Foulard's column; 13. Difference between the tactics of the ancients and those of the moderns; 14. Result of the foregoing chapters; Part II. Consequence of the Principle Which Requires a Military Base Previous to Any Operation: 1. Masses of fighting men; 2. One consequence of the foregoing exposition; [...]ope will one day be divided into several great states; 4. Natural limits; 5. The superiority given by the modern system of war to number over valour; 6. Perpetual peace; 7. Conclusion; Part III. Application of the Principle of the Base to Past Military Events, and to Those that May Take Place in Future: 1. Of the period at which the first development of the principle of the base was made; 2. Examination of some campaigns of the Seven Years' War; 3. Observations on the wars which have occurred since the Seven Years' War; 4. What are the natural bounds of the great European states?; Conclusion.
