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Beschreibung
  • Preface
  • Introduction
  • Part I: Behavioral Economics of Risk, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity
  • Introduction to Part I
  • 1: The Evidence on Human Choice under Risk and Uncertainty
  • 2: Behavioral Models of Decision Making
  • 3: Applications of Behavioral Decision Theory
  • 4: Human Behavior Under Ambiguity
  • Part II: Other-Regarding Preferences
  • Introduction to Part II
  • 5: The Evidence on Human Sociality
  • 6: Models of Other-Regarding Preferences
  • 7: Human Morality and Social Identity
  • 8: Incentives and Other-Regarding Preferences
  • Exercises
  • Part III: Behavioral Time Discounting
  • Introduction to Part III
  • 9: The Evidence on Temporal Human Choice
  • 10: Behavioral Models of Time Discounting
  • 11: Applications of Present Biased Preferences
  • Exercises
  • Part IV: Behavioral Game Theory
  • Introduction to Part IV
  • 12: The Evidence on Strategic Human Choice
  • 13: Models of Behavioral Game Theory
  • Exercises
  • Part V: Behavioral Models of Learning
  • Introduction to Part V
  • 14: Evolutionary Game Theory
  • 15: Models of Learning
  • 16: Stochastic Social Dynamics
  • Appendices and Exercises
  • Part VI: Emotions
  • Introduction to Part VI
  • 17: Emotions and Human Behavior
  • 18: Interaction Between Emotions and Cognition
  • Exercises
  • Part VII: Bounded Rationality
  • Introduction to Part VII
  • 19: Judgment Heuristics
  • 20: Mental Accounting
  • 21: Bounded Rationality in Financial Markets
  • Exercises
  • Part VIII: Behavioral Welfare Economics
  • Introduction to Part VIII
  • 22: Behavioral Welfare Economics
  • Exercises
  • Part IX: Neuroeconomics
  • Introduction to Part IX
  • 23: Neuroeconomics
  • Appendix on Game Theory
  • Introduction
  • Normal form games
  • A basic taxonomy of some normal form games
  • Two person zero sum games
  • Selection criteria among Nash equilibria: Payoff dominance and Risk Dominance
  • Extensive form games
  • Games of incomplete information
  • Correlated equilibrium
  • Preface
  • Introduction
  • Part I: Behavioral Economics of Risk, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity
  • Introduction to Part I
  • 1: The Evidence on Human Choice under Risk and Uncertainty
  • 2: Behavioral Models of Decision Making
  • 3: Applications of Behavioral Decision Theory
  • 4: Human Behavior Under Ambiguity
  • Part II: Other-Regarding Preferences
  • Introduction to Part II
  • 5: The Evidence on Human Sociality
  • 6: Models of Other-Regarding Preferences
  • 7: Human Morality and Social Identity
  • 8: Incentives and Other-Regarding Preferences
  • Exercises
  • Part III: Behavioral Time Discounting
  • Introduction to Part III
  • 9: The Evidence on Temporal Human Choice
  • 10: Behavioral Models of Time Discounting
  • 11: Applications of Present Biased Preferences
  • Exercises
  • Part IV: Behavioral Game Theory
  • Introduction to Part IV
  • 12: The Evidence on Strategic Human Choice
  • 13: Models of Behavioral Game Theory
  • Exercises
  • Part V: Behavioral Models of Learning
  • Introduction to Part V
  • 14: Evolutionary Game Theory
  • 15: Models of Learning
  • 16: Stochastic Social Dynamics
  • Appendices and Exercises
  • Part VI: Emotions
  • Introduction to Part VI
  • 17: Emotions and Human Behavior
  • 18: Interaction Between Emotions and Cognition
  • Exercises
  • Part VII: Bounded Rationality
  • Introduction to Part VII
  • 19: Judgment Heuristics
  • 20: Mental Accounting
  • 21: Bounded Rationality in Financial Markets
  • Exercises
  • Part VIII: Behavioral Welfare Economics
  • Introduction to Part VIII
  • 22: Behavioral Welfare Economics
  • Exercises
  • Part IX: Neuroeconomics
  • Introduction to Part IX
  • 23: Neuroeconomics
  • Appendix on Game Theory
  • Introduction
  • Normal form games
  • A basic taxonomy of some normal form games
  • Two person zero sum games
  • Selection criteria among Nash equilibria: Payoff dominance and Risk Dominance
  • Extensive form games
  • Games of incomplete information
  • Correlated equilibrium
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2016
Medium: Taschenbuch
Inhalt: Kartoniert / Broschiert
ISBN-13: 9780198715535
ISBN-10: 0198715536
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Dhami, Sanjit
Hersteller: Oxford University Press
OUP Oxford
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, Postfach:81 03 40, D-70567 Stuttgart, vertrieb@dbg.de
Abbildungen: Numerous Figures and Tables
Maße: 246 x 189 x 66 mm
Von/Mit: Sanjit Dhami
Erscheinungsdatum: 03.11.2016
Gewicht: 2,948 kg
Artikel-ID: 113134717