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The False Promise of Superiority
The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War
Taschenbuch von James H. Lebovic
Sprache: Englisch

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Beschreibung
In this book, James H. Lebovic argues that the policy approach to maintain nuclear superiority did not make sense during the Cold War and makes even less sense now. As he shows, the idea that nuclear superiority is an imperative still serves as the foundation for too much strategic policy in an era where utility of such weapons is highly questionable. Moreover, continuing to rely on them as coercive tools rests on deficient logic and is dangerous. Not only explaining why we remain stuck with a nuclear stance that is largely irrelevant to the era, this book also offers a way out of the type of thinking that keeps such policies in place.
In this book, James H. Lebovic argues that the policy approach to maintain nuclear superiority did not make sense during the Cold War and makes even less sense now. As he shows, the idea that nuclear superiority is an imperative still serves as the foundation for too much strategic policy in an era where utility of such weapons is highly questionable. Moreover, continuing to rely on them as coercive tools rests on deficient logic and is dangerous. Not only explaining why we remain stuck with a nuclear stance that is largely irrelevant to the era, this book also offers a way out of the type of thinking that keeps such policies in place.
Über den Autor
James H. Lebovic is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University. He has published widely on defense policy, deterrence strategy, arms control, military budgets and procurement, foreign aid, democracy and human rights, international organizations, international conflict and cooperation, and military intervention. He previously authored six books including Planning to Fail: The US War in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Oxford, 2019), Flawed Logics: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama (2013), The Limits of US Military Capability: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq (2010), and Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11 ( 2007). From 2015-2017, he chaired the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • Concepts and Arguments

  • Chapter 1: The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War

  • SECTION I: Assessing Nuclear Capability: The History and Implications of Alleged Nuclear Advantages

  • Chapter 2: The Cold War Nuclear Force Balance: The Challenge and Promise of Asymmetry

  • Chapter 3: Nuclear "Superiority" after the Cold War

  • SECTION II: Coercive Tactics: Boosting Credibility to Signal a US Willingness to Act on the US "Nuclear Advantage"

  • Chapter 4: Commitment

  • Chapter 5: Risk Manipulation

  • Chapter 6: Resolve and Reputation

  • SECTION III: Case Studies

  • Chapter 7: When Tactics Consume Strategy: Decision Making in the Cuban Missile Crisis

  • Chapter 8: When Red Lines Consume Debate: Thwarting Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Conclusions

  • Chapter 9: The Case for Nuclear Superiority: Assessing What We Know (and Do Not Know) about Nuclear Deterrence

  • Notes

  • Index

Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2023
Genre: Politikwissenschaften
Rubrik: Wissenschaften
Medium: Taschenbuch
Inhalt: Kartoniert / Broschiert
ISBN-13: 9780197680872
ISBN-10: 0197680879
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Lebovic, James H.
Hersteller: Oxford University Press Inc
Maße: 155 x 236 x 20 mm
Von/Mit: James H. Lebovic
Erscheinungsdatum: 13.03.2023
Gewicht: 0,414 kg
Artikel-ID: 125696251
Über den Autor
James H. Lebovic is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University. He has published widely on defense policy, deterrence strategy, arms control, military budgets and procurement, foreign aid, democracy and human rights, international organizations, international conflict and cooperation, and military intervention. He previously authored six books including Planning to Fail: The US War in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Oxford, 2019), Flawed Logics: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama (2013), The Limits of US Military Capability: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq (2010), and Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11 ( 2007). From 2015-2017, he chaired the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • Concepts and Arguments

  • Chapter 1: The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War

  • SECTION I: Assessing Nuclear Capability: The History and Implications of Alleged Nuclear Advantages

  • Chapter 2: The Cold War Nuclear Force Balance: The Challenge and Promise of Asymmetry

  • Chapter 3: Nuclear "Superiority" after the Cold War

  • SECTION II: Coercive Tactics: Boosting Credibility to Signal a US Willingness to Act on the US "Nuclear Advantage"

  • Chapter 4: Commitment

  • Chapter 5: Risk Manipulation

  • Chapter 6: Resolve and Reputation

  • SECTION III: Case Studies

  • Chapter 7: When Tactics Consume Strategy: Decision Making in the Cuban Missile Crisis

  • Chapter 8: When Red Lines Consume Debate: Thwarting Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Conclusions

  • Chapter 9: The Case for Nuclear Superiority: Assessing What We Know (and Do Not Know) about Nuclear Deterrence

  • Notes

  • Index

Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2023
Genre: Politikwissenschaften
Rubrik: Wissenschaften
Medium: Taschenbuch
Inhalt: Kartoniert / Broschiert
ISBN-13: 9780197680872
ISBN-10: 0197680879
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Lebovic, James H.
Hersteller: Oxford University Press Inc
Maße: 155 x 236 x 20 mm
Von/Mit: James H. Lebovic
Erscheinungsdatum: 13.03.2023
Gewicht: 0,414 kg
Artikel-ID: 125696251
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