Zum Hauptinhalt springen
Dekorationsartikel gehören nicht zum Leistungsumfang.
The Crisis of Crowding
Quant Copycats, Ugly Models, and the New Crash Normal
Buch von Ludwig B. Chincarini
Sprache: Englisch

37,90 €*

inkl. MwSt.

Versandkostenfrei per Post / DHL

Aktuell nicht verfügbar

Kategorien:
Beschreibung
A rare analytical look at the financial crisis using simple analysis

The economic crisis that began in 2008 revealed the numerous problems in our financial system, from the way mortgage loans were produced to the way Wall Street banks leveraged themselves. Curiously enough, however, most of the reasons for the banking collapse are very similar to the reasons that Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), the largest hedge fund to date, collapsed in 1998. The Crisis of Crowding looks at LTCM in greater detail, with new information, for a more accurate perspective, examining how the subsequent hedge funds started by Meriwether and former partners were destroyed again by the lapse of judgement in allowing Lehman Brothers to fail.

Covering the lessons that were ignored during LTCM's collapse but eventually connected to the financial crisis of 2008, the book presents a series of lessons for hedge funds and financial markets, including touching upon the circle of greed from homeowners to real estate agents to politicians to Wall Street.
* Guides the reader through the real story of Long-Term Capital Management with accurate descriptions, previously unpublished data, and interviews
* Describes the lessons that hedge funds, as well as the market, should have learned from LTCM's collapse
* Explores how the financial crisis and LTCM are a global phenomena rooted in failures to account for risk in crowded spaces with leverage
* Explains why quantitative finance is essential for every financial institution from risk management to valuation modeling to algorithmic trading
* Is filled with simple quantitative analysis about the financial crisis, from the Quant Crisis of 2007 to the failure of Lehman Brothers to the Flash Crash of 2010

A unique blend of storytelling and sound quantitative analysis, The Crisis of Crowding is one of the first books to offer an analytical look at the financial crisis rather than just an account of what happened. Also included are a layman's guide to the Dodd-Frank rules and what it means for the future, as well as an evaluation of the Fed's reaction to the crisis, QE1, QE2, and QE3.
A rare analytical look at the financial crisis using simple analysis

The economic crisis that began in 2008 revealed the numerous problems in our financial system, from the way mortgage loans were produced to the way Wall Street banks leveraged themselves. Curiously enough, however, most of the reasons for the banking collapse are very similar to the reasons that Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), the largest hedge fund to date, collapsed in 1998. The Crisis of Crowding looks at LTCM in greater detail, with new information, for a more accurate perspective, examining how the subsequent hedge funds started by Meriwether and former partners were destroyed again by the lapse of judgement in allowing Lehman Brothers to fail.

Covering the lessons that were ignored during LTCM's collapse but eventually connected to the financial crisis of 2008, the book presents a series of lessons for hedge funds and financial markets, including touching upon the circle of greed from homeowners to real estate agents to politicians to Wall Street.
* Guides the reader through the real story of Long-Term Capital Management with accurate descriptions, previously unpublished data, and interviews
* Describes the lessons that hedge funds, as well as the market, should have learned from LTCM's collapse
* Explores how the financial crisis and LTCM are a global phenomena rooted in failures to account for risk in crowded spaces with leverage
* Explains why quantitative finance is essential for every financial institution from risk management to valuation modeling to algorithmic trading
* Is filled with simple quantitative analysis about the financial crisis, from the Quant Crisis of 2007 to the failure of Lehman Brothers to the Flash Crash of 2010

A unique blend of storytelling and sound quantitative analysis, The Crisis of Crowding is one of the first books to offer an analytical look at the financial crisis rather than just an account of what happened. Also included are a layman's guide to the Dodd-Frank rules and what it means for the future, as well as an evaluation of the Fed's reaction to the crisis, QE1, QE2, and QE3.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Foreword xv

Preface xix

Cast of Characters xxiii

CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1

PART I: THE 1998 LTCM CRISIS 5

CHAPTER 2 Meriwether's MagicMoney Tree 7

The Birth of Bond Arbitrage 7

The Dream Team 11

Early Success 14

CHAPTER 3 Risk Management 21

The General Idea 21

Leverage 22

Measuring Risk 23

The rho 24

Economics 24

Copycats, Puppies, and Counterparties 25

LTCM's Actual Risk Management Practices 27

Diversification 27

Operations 28

The Raw Evidence 29

CHAPTER 4 The Trades 37

The Short U.S. Swap Trade 41

The European Cross-Country Swap Trade

(Short UK and Long Europe) 44

Long U.S. Mortgage Securities Hedged 46

The Box Spread in Japan 48

The Italian Swap Spread 50

Fixed-Income Volatility Trades 52

The On-the-Run and Off-the-Run Trade 54

Short Longer-Term Equity Index Volatility 57

Risk Arbitrage Trades 60

Equity Relative-Value Trades 63

Emerging Market Trades 65

Other Trades 67

The Portfolio of Trades 68

CHAPTER 5 The Collapse 71

Early Summer 1998 71

The Salomon Shutdown 73

The Russian Default 75

The Phone Calls 77

The Meriwether Letter 79

Buffett's Hostile Alaskan Offer 81


The Consortium Bailout 82

Too Big To Fail 84

Why Did It Happen? 85

Appendix 5.1 The John Meriwether Letter 89

Appendix 5.2 The Warren Buffett Letter 93

CHAPTER 6 The Fate of LTCM Investors 95

CHAPTER 7 General Lessons from the Collapse 101

Interconnected Crowds 101

VaR 102

Leverage 105

Clearinghouses 108

Compensation 110

What's Size Got to Do with It? 110

Contingency Capital 113

The Fed Is a Coordinator of Last Resort 114

Counterparty Due Diligence 115

Spread the Love 115

Quantitative Theory Did Not Cause the LTCM Collapse 116

D´ej`a Vu 118

PART II: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 121

CHAPTER 8 The Quant Crisis 123

The Subprime Mortgage Market Collapse 127

What Was the Quant Crisis? 129

The Erratic Behavior of Quant Factors 130

Standard Factors 130

Quantitative Portfolio Factors 133

Causes of the Quant Crisis 134

The Shed Show 137

CHAPTER 9 The Bear Stearns Collapse 141

A Brief History of the Bear 141

Shadow Banking 143


Window Dressing 144

Repo Power 145

The Unexpected Hibernation 148

The Polar Spring 150

CHAPTER 10 Money for Nothing and Fannie and Freddie for Free 155

The Basic Business 157

Where's the Risk? 158

CDO and CDO2 159

The Gigantic Hedge Fund 162

Big-Time Profits 165

The U.S. Housing Bubble 168

The Circle of Greed 170

Real Estate Agents and Mortgage Lender Tricks 173

Home Owners 177

Profits and Politicians 177

The Media and Regulators 180

Grade Inflation 182

Commercial Banks 185

Freddie and Fannie's Foreclosure 186

Why Save Freddie and Fannie? 187

Did Anyone Know? 188

CHAPTER 11 The Lehman Bankruptcy 191

The Wall Street Club 191

Why Was Lehman Next? 193

Business Exposure 196

A Chronology of the Gori
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2012
Fachbereich: Einzelne Wirtschaftszweige
Genre: Wirtschaft
Rubrik: Recht & Wirtschaft
Medium: Buch
Inhalt: 512 S.
ISBN-13: 9781118250020
ISBN-10: 1118250028
Sprache: Englisch
Herstellernummer: 1W118250020
Autor: Chincarini, Ludwig B.
Auflage: 1. Auflage
Hersteller: Wiley & Sons
Maße: 33 x 158 x 236 mm
Von/Mit: Ludwig B. Chincarini
Erscheinungsdatum: 21.08.2012
Gewicht: 0,85 kg
Artikel-ID: 106662164
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Foreword xv

Preface xix

Cast of Characters xxiii

CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1

PART I: THE 1998 LTCM CRISIS 5

CHAPTER 2 Meriwether's MagicMoney Tree 7

The Birth of Bond Arbitrage 7

The Dream Team 11

Early Success 14

CHAPTER 3 Risk Management 21

The General Idea 21

Leverage 22

Measuring Risk 23

The rho 24

Economics 24

Copycats, Puppies, and Counterparties 25

LTCM's Actual Risk Management Practices 27

Diversification 27

Operations 28

The Raw Evidence 29

CHAPTER 4 The Trades 37

The Short U.S. Swap Trade 41

The European Cross-Country Swap Trade

(Short UK and Long Europe) 44

Long U.S. Mortgage Securities Hedged 46

The Box Spread in Japan 48

The Italian Swap Spread 50

Fixed-Income Volatility Trades 52

The On-the-Run and Off-the-Run Trade 54

Short Longer-Term Equity Index Volatility 57

Risk Arbitrage Trades 60

Equity Relative-Value Trades 63

Emerging Market Trades 65

Other Trades 67

The Portfolio of Trades 68

CHAPTER 5 The Collapse 71

Early Summer 1998 71

The Salomon Shutdown 73

The Russian Default 75

The Phone Calls 77

The Meriwether Letter 79

Buffett's Hostile Alaskan Offer 81


The Consortium Bailout 82

Too Big To Fail 84

Why Did It Happen? 85

Appendix 5.1 The John Meriwether Letter 89

Appendix 5.2 The Warren Buffett Letter 93

CHAPTER 6 The Fate of LTCM Investors 95

CHAPTER 7 General Lessons from the Collapse 101

Interconnected Crowds 101

VaR 102

Leverage 105

Clearinghouses 108

Compensation 110

What's Size Got to Do with It? 110

Contingency Capital 113

The Fed Is a Coordinator of Last Resort 114

Counterparty Due Diligence 115

Spread the Love 115

Quantitative Theory Did Not Cause the LTCM Collapse 116

D´ej`a Vu 118

PART II: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 121

CHAPTER 8 The Quant Crisis 123

The Subprime Mortgage Market Collapse 127

What Was the Quant Crisis? 129

The Erratic Behavior of Quant Factors 130

Standard Factors 130

Quantitative Portfolio Factors 133

Causes of the Quant Crisis 134

The Shed Show 137

CHAPTER 9 The Bear Stearns Collapse 141

A Brief History of the Bear 141

Shadow Banking 143


Window Dressing 144

Repo Power 145

The Unexpected Hibernation 148

The Polar Spring 150

CHAPTER 10 Money for Nothing and Fannie and Freddie for Free 155

The Basic Business 157

Where's the Risk? 158

CDO and CDO2 159

The Gigantic Hedge Fund 162

Big-Time Profits 165

The U.S. Housing Bubble 168

The Circle of Greed 170

Real Estate Agents and Mortgage Lender Tricks 173

Home Owners 177

Profits and Politicians 177

The Media and Regulators 180

Grade Inflation 182

Commercial Banks 185

Freddie and Fannie's Foreclosure 186

Why Save Freddie and Fannie? 187

Did Anyone Know? 188

CHAPTER 11 The Lehman Bankruptcy 191

The Wall Street Club 191

Why Was Lehman Next? 193

Business Exposure 196

A Chronology of the Gori
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2012
Fachbereich: Einzelne Wirtschaftszweige
Genre: Wirtschaft
Rubrik: Recht & Wirtschaft
Medium: Buch
Inhalt: 512 S.
ISBN-13: 9781118250020
ISBN-10: 1118250028
Sprache: Englisch
Herstellernummer: 1W118250020
Autor: Chincarini, Ludwig B.
Auflage: 1. Auflage
Hersteller: Wiley & Sons
Maße: 33 x 158 x 236 mm
Von/Mit: Ludwig B. Chincarini
Erscheinungsdatum: 21.08.2012
Gewicht: 0,85 kg
Artikel-ID: 106662164
Warnhinweis

Ähnliche Produkte

Ähnliche Produkte