Dekorationsartikel gehören nicht zum Leistungsumfang.
Sprache:
Englisch
84,95 €
Versandkostenfrei per Post / DHL
Lieferzeit 1-2 Wochen
Kategorien:
Beschreibung
There has been explosive progress in the economic theory of uncertainty and information in the past few decades. This subject is now taught not only in departments of economics but also in professional schools and programs oriented toward business, government and administration, and public policy. This book attempts to unify the subject matter in a simple, accessible manner. Part I of the book focuses on the economics of uncertainty; Part II examines the economics of information. This revised and updated second edition places a greater focus on game theory. New topics include posted-price markets, mechanism design, common-value auctions, and the one-shot deviation principle for repeated games.
There has been explosive progress in the economic theory of uncertainty and information in the past few decades. This subject is now taught not only in departments of economics but also in professional schools and programs oriented toward business, government and administration, and public policy. This book attempts to unify the subject matter in a simple, accessible manner. Part I of the book focuses on the economics of uncertainty; Part II examines the economics of information. This revised and updated second edition places a greater focus on game theory. New topics include posted-price markets, mechanism design, common-value auctions, and the one-shot deviation principle for repeated games.
Über den Autor
Sushil Bikhchandani is a Professor in the Anderson School of Management Economics at the University of California, Los Angeles. His teaching and research interests include auctions, market institutions, herd behavior and information economics. Professor Bikhchandani has published in numerous academic journals, including Theoretical Economics, Operations Research, the Journal of Economic Theory, and Econometrica.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Part I: 1. Elements of decision under uncertainty; 2. Risk-bearing: the optimum of the individual; 3. Comparative statics of the risk-bearing optimum; 4. Market equilibrium under uncertainty; Part II: 5. Information and informational decisions; 6. Information and markets; 7. Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium concepts; 8. Informational asymmetry and contract design; 9. Competition and hidden knowledge; 10. Market institutions; 11. Long-run relationships and the credibility of threats and promises; 12. Information aggregation, transmission, and acquisition.
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: | 2017 |
---|---|
Fachbereich: | Allgemeines |
Genre: | Importe, Wirtschaft |
Rubrik: | Recht & Wirtschaft |
Medium: | Taschenbuch |
ISBN-13: | 9780521541961 |
ISBN-10: | 0521541964 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Einband: | Kartoniert / Broschiert |
Autor: |
Bikhchandani, Sushil
Hirshleifer, Jack Riley, John G. |
Hersteller: | Cambridge University Press |
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: | Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de |
Maße: | 229 x 152 x 27 mm |
Von/Mit: | Sushil Bikhchandani (u. a.) |
Erscheinungsdatum: | 20.03.2017 |
Gewicht: | 0,728 kg |