An outstanding analysis of The First Afghan War

Among British Army historians the reputation of Sir John Fortescue stands virtually without equal. His comprehensive fourteen volume history is a work of unparalleled achievement in its field. Fortescue combines thorough source material research with insightful academic observation of the conduct of the campaigns he describes and of the decisions, errors and strategic and tactical options of their principal protagonists. The Leonaur editors have carefully selected passages from Fortescue's magnum opus to create a series of books, each focusing on a specific war or campaign.
Almost every student of the British Empire at war during the 19th century knows that the army that marched to Kabul, to secure the unpopular Shah Shuja on the throne of Afghanistan, was annihilated. Much of the blame for that debacle has fallen-quite unjustly according to Fortescue-upon the shoulders of Elphinstone, the ill-fated commander. Although The First Afghan War was a notorious blunder of cataclysmic proportions, Fortescue's perspective on it will be a revelation to many readers. The war began as a conflict instigated by the British, over an unnecessary issue that was never in contention, against a leader of his people who was broadly amenable to British objectives. The conduct of the war, fought over the most hostile terrain populated by a fierce, resourceful enemy, disintegrated through mismanagement, incompetence, double dealing and treachery, into a humiliating defeat for British arms and prestige in India. Fortescue's scathing assessment of the roles of civil servants and political officers, including Burnes, McNaughten and others, is an insightful appraisal of the consequences of the subversion of the authority of military officers by civilian appointed powers in a theatre of war.
Leonaur editions are newly typeset and are not facsimiles; each title is available in softcover and hardback with dustjacket.