Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from...

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Beschreibung

This book reconsiders the supposed impossibility of deriving "Ought" from "Is". John R. Searle¿s 1964 article How to Derive "Ought " from "Is¿¿ sent shockwaves through the philosophical community by offering a straightforward counterexample to this claim of impossibility: from your promising something- and this is an "is" - it simply follows that you "ought" to do it. This volume opens with a brand new chapter from Searle who, in light of his subsequent philosophical developments, expounds the reasons for the validity of that derivation and its crucial significance for social ontology and moral philosophy. Then, in a fresh interview with the editors of this volume, Searle explores a range of topics including how his derivation relates to constitutive rules, and how he views Wittgenstein¿s philosophy, deontic logic, and the rationality of action.

The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive into Searle¿s essay and its implications by international scholars with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy and sociology of law. With thirteen original chapters, the contributors provide fresh and timely insights on hotly debated issues: the nature of "Ought"; the logical structure of the social world; and the possibility of deriving not only "Ought" from "Is", but "Is" from "Ought".

Über den Autor

Paolo Di Lucia is Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Milan, Italy. His research interests include the philosophy of normative language, social ontology, and philosophy of justice. His previous publications include Deontica in von Wright (1992), L'universale della promessa (1997), and Normatività. Diritto linguaggio azione (2003, Spanish translation 2009).

Edoardo Fittipaldi is Professor of Sociology of Law at the University of Milan, Italy. His research interests include the epistemology of social sciences, legal realisms, and social ontology. Among his books are Scienza del diritto e razionalismo critico. Il programma epistemologico di Hans Albert per la scienza e sociologia del diritto (2003) and Everyday Legal Ontology (2012).

Zusammenfassung

Includes a new and unpublished essay by John R. Searle

Examines the Is/Ought question from the standpoints of semantics, pragmatics, the theory of constitutive rules, and legal theory

Provides an in-depth exploration of the puzzles raised by Searle's chapter by leading international scholars

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Part 1.- Chapter 1. How to Derive "Ought" from "Is" Revisited. John R. Searle.- Chapter 2. An Interview with John R. Searle. Paolo Di Lucia & Edoardo Fittipaldi.- Part 2.- Chapter 3.Is and Ought: Where Does the Problem Lie?. Pedro M.S.Alves.- Chapter 4. Searlean "Is" and "Ought" Revisited. Wojciech ¿e¿aniec.- Chapter 5. Some Remarks on Searle's View on the Logic of Practical Reasoning. Marco Santambrogio.- Chapter 6. On the Regulative Functions of Constitutive Rules. Frederick Schauer.- Chapter 7. Existence as the Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle's Way. Roberto De Monticelli.- Chapter 8. How to Derive Is from Ought. Amedo Giovanni Conte.- Chapter 9. Searle vs. Conte on Constitutive Rules. Corrado Roversi.- Chapter 10. "Ought" is Spoken in Many Ways. Paolo Di Lucia.- Chapter 11. Constitutive Rules, Criteria of Validity, and Law. Matthew Grellette.- Chapter 12. Can Constitutive Rules Bridge the Gap Between Is and Ought Statements?. Frank A. Hindriks.- Chapter 13. Searle and Conte on Deriving Ought from Is. Jan Wole¿ski.- Chapter 14. Why Moral Norms Cannot Be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral "Ought" from "Is". Wojciech Zäuski.- Chapter 15. On Searle's Derivation and its Relation to Constitutive Rules: A Social Scientist's Perspective. Edoardo Fittipaldi.

Details

Erscheinungsjahr:	2022
Fachbereich:	Allgemeines
Genre:	Philosophie
Jahrhundert:	Antike
Rubrik:	Geisteswissenschaften
Thema:	Lexika
Medium:	Taschenbuch
Seiten:	372
Inhalt:	xxvii 344 S. 2 s/w Illustr. 344 p. 2 illus.
ISBN-13:	9783030541187
ISBN-10:	3030541185
Sprache:	Englisch
Ausstattung / Beilage:	Paperback
Einband:	Kartoniert / Broschiert
Redaktion:	Fittipaldi, Edoardo Di Lucia, Paolo
Herausgeber:	Paolo Di Lucia/Edoardo Fittipaldi
Auflage:	1st ed. 2021
Hersteller:	Springer International Publishing Springer International Publishing AG
Maße:	210 x 148 x 21 mm
Von/Mit:	Edoardo Fittipaldi (u. a.)
Erscheinungsdatum:	17.02.2022
Gewicht:	0,481 kg

preigu-id: 121145230