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Reasons as Defaults
Taschenbuch von John Francis Horty
Sprache: Englisch

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Beschreibung
In this volume, John Horty brings to bear his work in logic to present a framework that allows for answers to key questions about reasons and reasoning, namely: What are reasons, and how do they support actions or conclusions?
In this volume, John Horty brings to bear his work in logic to present a framework that allows for answers to key questions about reasons and reasoning, namely: What are reasons, and how do they support actions or conclusions?
Über den Autor
John Horty is Professor of Philosophy, University of Maryland. He is the author of Agency and Deontic Logic and Frege on Definitions.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • Introduction

  • I Default logic

  • 1 A Primer on Default Logic

  • 1.1 Basic concepts

  • 1.1.1 Default rules

  • 1.1.2 Priority relations

  • 1.1.3 Theories and scenarios

  • 1.2 Central definitions

  • 1.2.1 Binding defaults

  • 1.2.2 Proper scenarios and extensions

  • 1.3 Extensions and conclusions

  • 1.3.1 Theories with multiple extensions

  • 1.3.2 Theories without extensions

  • 2 From Defaults to Reasons

  • 2.1 An austere theory of reasons

  • 2.2 Developing the theory

  • 2.2.1 Conflict, strength, and defeat

  • 2.2.2 Reasons and enablers

  • 2.2.3 Reason amalgamation

  • II Deontic Logic

  • 3 Reasons and Oughts

  • 3.1 The two logics

  • 3.1.1 Simple oughts

  • 3.1.2 Conditional oughts

  • 3.1.3 Some history

  • 3.2 Properties of the logics

  • 4 Moral Conflicts

  • 4.1 Logical objections

  • 4.1.1 Agglomeration

  • 4.1.2 Other logical objections

  • 4.2 Conceptual objections

  • 4.3 Objections based on reasons as moral forces

  • III Some Elaborations

  • 5 Variable Priorities and Exclusion

  • 5.1 Variable priority default theories

  • 5.1.1 The definition

  • 5.1.2 Some examples

  • 5.2 Exclusionary default theories

  • 5.2.1 The definition

  • 5.2.2 Some examples

  • 5.3 Discussion

  • 5.3.1 Downward closure of exclusion

  • 5.3.2 Exclusion by weaker defaults

  • 5.3.3 Excluders, intensifiers, and attenuators

  • 6 Particularism

  • 6.1 Dancy's argument

  • 6.2 Evaluating the argument

  • 6.3 Discussion

  • 6.3.1 Pragmatic considerations

  • 6.3.2 Borrowing a book

  • 6.3.3 Moderate particularism

  • IV Some complications

  • 7 Skepticism and Floating Conclusions

  • 7.1 Floating conclusions

  • 7.1.1 Arguments and paths

  • 7.1.2 Two versions of skepticism

  • 7.2 The problem with floating conclusions

  • 7.2.1 An example

  • 7.2.2 Objections to the example

  • 7.3 Discussion

  • 7.3.1 Other examples

  • 7.3.2 Skepticism

  • 8 Problems with Priorities

  • 8.1 Refining the concept of defeat

  • 8.2 Controlling the order of application

  • 8.3 Discussion

  • 8.3.1 Inappropriate equilibria

  • 8.3.2 Other orderings

  • 8.3.3 Reinstatement

  • V Appendices

  • A Notes on the default logics

  • A.1 Proper scenarios

  • A.2 Some observations on defeat

  • A.3 Normal default theories

  • B Notes on the deontic logics

  • B.1 A comparison with van Fraassen's logic

  • B.2 A comparison with standard deontic logic

Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2014
Fachbereich: Allgemeines
Genre: Importe, Philosophie
Jahrhundert: Antike
Rubrik: Geisteswissenschaften
Thema: Lexika
Medium: Taschenbuch
ISBN-13: 9780199396443
ISBN-10: 0199396442
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Horty, John Francis
Hersteller: Oxford University Press
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: preigu, Ansas Meyer, Lengericher Landstr. 19, D-49078 Osnabrück, mail@preigu.de
Maße: 234 x 156 x 16 mm
Von/Mit: John Francis Horty
Erscheinungsdatum: 01.08.2014
Gewicht: 0,474 kg
Artikel-ID: 124125652
Über den Autor
John Horty is Professor of Philosophy, University of Maryland. He is the author of Agency and Deontic Logic and Frege on Definitions.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • Introduction

  • I Default logic

  • 1 A Primer on Default Logic

  • 1.1 Basic concepts

  • 1.1.1 Default rules

  • 1.1.2 Priority relations

  • 1.1.3 Theories and scenarios

  • 1.2 Central definitions

  • 1.2.1 Binding defaults

  • 1.2.2 Proper scenarios and extensions

  • 1.3 Extensions and conclusions

  • 1.3.1 Theories with multiple extensions

  • 1.3.2 Theories without extensions

  • 2 From Defaults to Reasons

  • 2.1 An austere theory of reasons

  • 2.2 Developing the theory

  • 2.2.1 Conflict, strength, and defeat

  • 2.2.2 Reasons and enablers

  • 2.2.3 Reason amalgamation

  • II Deontic Logic

  • 3 Reasons and Oughts

  • 3.1 The two logics

  • 3.1.1 Simple oughts

  • 3.1.2 Conditional oughts

  • 3.1.3 Some history

  • 3.2 Properties of the logics

  • 4 Moral Conflicts

  • 4.1 Logical objections

  • 4.1.1 Agglomeration

  • 4.1.2 Other logical objections

  • 4.2 Conceptual objections

  • 4.3 Objections based on reasons as moral forces

  • III Some Elaborations

  • 5 Variable Priorities and Exclusion

  • 5.1 Variable priority default theories

  • 5.1.1 The definition

  • 5.1.2 Some examples

  • 5.2 Exclusionary default theories

  • 5.2.1 The definition

  • 5.2.2 Some examples

  • 5.3 Discussion

  • 5.3.1 Downward closure of exclusion

  • 5.3.2 Exclusion by weaker defaults

  • 5.3.3 Excluders, intensifiers, and attenuators

  • 6 Particularism

  • 6.1 Dancy's argument

  • 6.2 Evaluating the argument

  • 6.3 Discussion

  • 6.3.1 Pragmatic considerations

  • 6.3.2 Borrowing a book

  • 6.3.3 Moderate particularism

  • IV Some complications

  • 7 Skepticism and Floating Conclusions

  • 7.1 Floating conclusions

  • 7.1.1 Arguments and paths

  • 7.1.2 Two versions of skepticism

  • 7.2 The problem with floating conclusions

  • 7.2.1 An example

  • 7.2.2 Objections to the example

  • 7.3 Discussion

  • 7.3.1 Other examples

  • 7.3.2 Skepticism

  • 8 Problems with Priorities

  • 8.1 Refining the concept of defeat

  • 8.2 Controlling the order of application

  • 8.3 Discussion

  • 8.3.1 Inappropriate equilibria

  • 8.3.2 Other orderings

  • 8.3.3 Reinstatement

  • V Appendices

  • A Notes on the default logics

  • A.1 Proper scenarios

  • A.2 Some observations on defeat

  • A.3 Normal default theories

  • B Notes on the deontic logics

  • B.1 A comparison with van Fraassen's logic

  • B.2 A comparison with standard deontic logic

Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2014
Fachbereich: Allgemeines
Genre: Importe, Philosophie
Jahrhundert: Antike
Rubrik: Geisteswissenschaften
Thema: Lexika
Medium: Taschenbuch
ISBN-13: 9780199396443
ISBN-10: 0199396442
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Horty, John Francis
Hersteller: Oxford University Press
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: preigu, Ansas Meyer, Lengericher Landstr. 19, D-49078 Osnabrück, mail@preigu.de
Maße: 234 x 156 x 16 mm
Von/Mit: John Francis Horty
Erscheinungsdatum: 01.08.2014
Gewicht: 0,474 kg
Artikel-ID: 124125652
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