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Beschreibung
Why are some countries less corrupt and better governed than others? Challenging conventional explanations on the remarkable differences in quality of government worldwide, this book argues that the organization of bureaucracy is an often overlooked but critical factor. Countries where merit-recruited employees occupy public bureaucracies perform better than those where public employees owe their post to political connections. The book provides a coherent theory of why, and ample evidence showing that meritocratic bureaucracies are conducive to lower levels of corruption, higher government effectiveness, and more flexibility to adopt modernizing reforms. Data comes from both a novel dataset on the bureaucratic structures of over 100 countries as well as from narratives of particular countries, with a special focus on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Spain and Sweden. A notable contribution to the literature in comparative politics and public policy on good governance, and to corruption studies more widely.
Why are some countries less corrupt and better governed than others? Challenging conventional explanations on the remarkable differences in quality of government worldwide, this book argues that the organization of bureaucracy is an often overlooked but critical factor. Countries where merit-recruited employees occupy public bureaucracies perform better than those where public employees owe their post to political connections. The book provides a coherent theory of why, and ample evidence showing that meritocratic bureaucracies are conducive to lower levels of corruption, higher government effectiveness, and more flexibility to adopt modernizing reforms. Data comes from both a novel dataset on the bureaucratic structures of over 100 countries as well as from narratives of particular countries, with a special focus on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Spain and Sweden. A notable contribution to the literature in comparative politics and public policy on good governance, and to corruption studies more widely.
Über den Autor
Carl Dahlström is Professor at the Department of Political Science, Göteborgs Universitet, Sweden, and Research Fellow at the Quality of Government Institute. His research is concerned with comparative and historical perspectives on public administration, administrative reforms and welfare state policymaking.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1. Why relations between politicians and bureaucrats matter; 2. Theory; 3. A closed Weberian bureaucracy; 4. Corruption; 5. Effectiveness; 6. Reforms; 7. Conclusions.
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2017
Genre: Importe, Politikwissenschaften
Rubrik: Wissenschaften
Medium: Taschenbuch
ISBN-13: 9781316630655
ISBN-10: 131663065X
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Dahlström, Carl
Lapuente, Victor
Hersteller: Cambridge University Press
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße: 229 x 152 x 15 mm
Von/Mit: Carl Dahlström (u. a.)
Erscheinungsdatum: 29.06.2017
Gewicht: 0,402 kg
Artikel-ID: 109435332

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