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Oligopoly Pricing
Old Ideas and New Tools
Taschenbuch von Xavier Vives
Sprache: Englisch

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Beschreibung
The "oligopoly problem"—the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors—is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field—including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson—to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.
The "oligopoly problem"—the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors—is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field—including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson—to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.
Über den Autor
Xavier Vives is Director of the Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica, Barcelona.
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2001
Fachbereich: Allgemeines
Genre: Wirtschaft
Rubrik: Recht & Wirtschaft
Medium: Taschenbuch
Seiten: 442
ISBN-13: 9780262720403
ISBN-10: 026272040X
Sprache: Englisch
Ausstattung / Beilage: Paperback
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Vives, Xavier
Hersteller: MIT Press
Maße: 229 x 152 x 26 mm
Von/Mit: Xavier Vives
Erscheinungsdatum: 27.07.2001
Gewicht: 0,713 kg
preigu-id: 128836492
Über den Autor
Xavier Vives is Director of the Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica, Barcelona.
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2001
Fachbereich: Allgemeines
Genre: Wirtschaft
Rubrik: Recht & Wirtschaft
Medium: Taschenbuch
Seiten: 442
ISBN-13: 9780262720403
ISBN-10: 026272040X
Sprache: Englisch
Ausstattung / Beilage: Paperback
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Vives, Xavier
Hersteller: MIT Press
Maße: 229 x 152 x 26 mm
Von/Mit: Xavier Vives
Erscheinungsdatum: 27.07.2001
Gewicht: 0,713 kg
preigu-id: 128836492
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