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Beschreibung
In this provocative study, Robert Cummins takes on philosophers, both old and new, who pursue the question of mental representation as an abstraction, apart from the constraints of any particular theory or framework. Cummins asserts that mental representation is, in fact, a problem in the philosophy of science, a theoretical assumption that serves different explanatory roles within the different contexts of commonsense or "folk" psychology, orthodox computation, connectionism, or neuroscience.

Cummins looks at existing and traditional accounts by Locke, Fodor, Dretske, Millikan, and others of the nature of mental representation and evaluates these accounts within the context of orthodox computational theories of cognition. He proposes that popular accounts of mental representation are inconsistent with the empirical assumptions of these models, which require an account of representation like that involved in mathematical modeling. In the final chapter he considers how mental representation might look in a connectionist context.

A Bradford Book.

In this provocative study, Robert Cummins takes on philosophers, both old and new, who pursue the question of mental representation as an abstraction, apart from the constraints of any particular theory or framework. Cummins asserts that mental representation is, in fact, a problem in the philosophy of science, a theoretical assumption that serves different explanatory roles within the different contexts of commonsense or "folk" psychology, orthodox computation, connectionism, or neuroscience.

Cummins looks at existing and traditional accounts by Locke, Fodor, Dretske, Millikan, and others of the nature of mental representation and evaluates these accounts within the context of orthodox computational theories of cognition. He proposes that popular accounts of mental representation are inconsistent with the empirical assumptions of these models, which require an account of representation like that involved in mathematical modeling. In the final chapter he considers how mental representation might look in a connectionist context.

A Bradford Book.

Über den Autor
Robert Cummins is Professor of Philosophy at University of Illinois-Urbana/Champaign.
Details
Empfohlen (von): 18
Erscheinungsjahr: 1991
Fachbereich: Allgemeines
Genre: Importe, Psychologie
Rubrik: Geisteswissenschaften
Thema: Lexika
Medium: Taschenbuch
Inhalt: Einband - flex.(Paperback)
ISBN-13: 9780262530965
ISBN-10: 0262530961
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Cummins, Robert
Hersteller: MIT Press
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße: 203 x 133 x 11 mm
Von/Mit: Robert Cummins
Erscheinungsdatum: 05.02.1991
Gewicht: 0,225 kg
Artikel-ID: 101359954