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Kant's Thinker
Taschenbuch von Patricia Kitcher
Sprache: Englisch

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Beschreibung
This book examines the Critique of Pure Reason's account of the relation between cognition and self-consciousness. It shows how the theory that cognizers must understand their mental states as standing in relations of rational connection has implications for theories of the self-ascription of belief, consciousness and knowledge of other subjects.
This book examines the Critique of Pure Reason's account of the relation between cognition and self-consciousness. It shows how the theory that cognizers must understand their mental states as standing in relations of rational connection has implications for theories of the self-ascription of belief, consciousness and knowledge of other subjects.
Über den Autor
Patricia Kitcher is Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. She is the author of Kant's Transcendental Psychology.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • 1. Overview

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. Interpretive Framework

  • 3. Preview

  • 4. Current Work on Kant's 'I-Think'

  • Part I: Background

  • 2. Locke's Internal Sense and Kant's Changing Views

  • 1. Locke's Influence

  • 2. Locke's Complex Theory of Internal Sense

  • 3. Kant's Varied Reactions

  • 4. 'Inner Sense' in relation to Kantian 'Apperception'

  • 5. Kant's Use of 'Inner Sense'

  • 3. Personal Identity and Its Problems

  • 1. Locke's Problem

  • 2. Leibniz's Criticisms and Additions

  • 3. Kant and Hume

  • 4. Tetens (and Hume)

  • 4. Rationalist Metaphysics of Mind

  • 1. The Role of Rationalism

  • 2. Leibniz's Elegant 'I-theory'

  • 3. Faculties, Powers and Substances

  • 4. Rational Psychology

  • 5. Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Cognition

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. Locke's 'Reflection' and Leibniz's 'Apperception'

  • 3. Self-consciousness and Object cognition

  • 4. Self-Consciousness through Self-Feeling

  • 5. Summary

  • 6. Strands of Argument in the Duisburg Nachla?

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. Kant's Objection to the Inaugural Dissertation

  • 3. Principles of Appearance and Thought in the Duisburg NachlaB Notion of Apperception?

  • 4. What is the Duisburg Nachla?'s Notion of 'Apperception?

  • 5. From the Duisburg NachlaB to the Critique

  • Part II: Theory

  • 7. A Transcendental Deduction for A Priori Concepts

  • 1. Kant's Goal

  • 2. Clues to the Nature of the Argument

  • 3. The First Premise of the Transcendental Deduction

  • 4. Apriority and Activity

  • 5. A 'Transcendental' Deduction

  • 8. Synthesis: Why and How?

  • 1. Problems to be Solved

  • 2. Kant's Definition

  • 3. Synthesis and Objective Reference

  • 4. Five Syntheses and Their Relations

  • 9. Arguing for Apperception

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. 'I-Think' as the 'Cogito'; The One-step Deduction from Judgment

  • 3. What Kind of Cognition Is at Issue in the Transcendental Deduction?

  • 4. What is the Principle of Apperception?

  • 5. The Apperceptive Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept

  • 6.Combination and Self-Consciousness in the B Deduction

  • 7. Arguing from the Unity of Apperception to the Necessary Applicability of Categories to Intuitions

  • 8. Transcendental Apperception, Empirical Apperception and 'Mineness'

  • 9. Summary

  • 10. The Power of Apperception

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. What is the Power/Faculty of Apperception?

  • 3. Does the Faculty of Apperception Endure? Is it the 'Inner Principle' of a Substance?

  • 4. Does the Power of Apperception Initiate Causal Chains or Provide Impressions of Necessary Connection?

  • 5. 'Is it an Experience That I think?'

  • 6. Root Powers, Scientific Ideals and the Ground of Appearances

  • 11. 'I-Think' as the Destroyer of Rational Psychology

  • 1. Understanding Kant's Criticisms

  • 2. Kant's Earlier and Later Treatments of Rational Psychology

  • 3. 'I-Think' as the Vehicle of the Categories

  • 4. 'I-Think' as Analytically Contained in the Concept of Thought

  • 5. Does the Analysis of Cognition Imply the Existence of a Thinker?

  • 6. Why Can't Thinkers Know Themselves as Such?

  • Part III: Evaluation

  • 12. Is Kant's Theory Consistent?

  • 1. The Old Objection

  • 2. The Most Problematic Passage (A251-52)

  • 3. The Confusion about the Causes of Sensations

  • 4. A Second Look at the Most Problematic Passage

  • 5. Criticizing Rationalist Confusions

  • 6. What Kant's Epistemology and Metaphysics Imply

  • 13. The Normativity Objection

  • 1. Psychologism or Noumenalism?

  • 2. Scrutinizing Sensations and Adding 'Transcendental Content'

  • 3. Forming Concepts and Acquiring the I-Representation

  • 4. Making A Priori Principles Explicit and Testing Instances

  • 5. Normativity and the I-rule

  • Appendix to Chapter 13: Longuenesse on Concept Formation

  • 14. Is Kant's Thinker (as Such) a Free and Responsible Agent?

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. Texts Linking Theoretical and Practical Reason

  • 3. Autonomy and Accountability

  • 4. Intellectual Accountability

  • 15. Kant our Contemporary

  • 1. Supporting and Showing Relevance

  • 2. Transcendental Arguments

  • 3. Must Rational Cognition involve Self-consciousness?

  • 4. A Second Hard Problem of Consciousness?

  • 5. Other 'I's

Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2014
Genre: Importe, Philosophie
Jahrhundert: 20. & 21. Jahrhundert
Rubrik: Geisteswissenschaften
Medium: Taschenbuch
Inhalt: Kartoniert / Broschiert
ISBN-13: 9780199363728
ISBN-10: 0199363722
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Kitcher, Patricia
Hersteller: Oxford University Press
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße: 234 x 156 x 19 mm
Von/Mit: Patricia Kitcher
Erscheinungsdatum: 01.02.2014
Gewicht: 0,56 kg
Artikel-ID: 120664935
Über den Autor
Patricia Kitcher is Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. She is the author of Kant's Transcendental Psychology.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • 1. Overview

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. Interpretive Framework

  • 3. Preview

  • 4. Current Work on Kant's 'I-Think'

  • Part I: Background

  • 2. Locke's Internal Sense and Kant's Changing Views

  • 1. Locke's Influence

  • 2. Locke's Complex Theory of Internal Sense

  • 3. Kant's Varied Reactions

  • 4. 'Inner Sense' in relation to Kantian 'Apperception'

  • 5. Kant's Use of 'Inner Sense'

  • 3. Personal Identity and Its Problems

  • 1. Locke's Problem

  • 2. Leibniz's Criticisms and Additions

  • 3. Kant and Hume

  • 4. Tetens (and Hume)

  • 4. Rationalist Metaphysics of Mind

  • 1. The Role of Rationalism

  • 2. Leibniz's Elegant 'I-theory'

  • 3. Faculties, Powers and Substances

  • 4. Rational Psychology

  • 5. Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Cognition

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. Locke's 'Reflection' and Leibniz's 'Apperception'

  • 3. Self-consciousness and Object cognition

  • 4. Self-Consciousness through Self-Feeling

  • 5. Summary

  • 6. Strands of Argument in the Duisburg Nachla?

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. Kant's Objection to the Inaugural Dissertation

  • 3. Principles of Appearance and Thought in the Duisburg NachlaB Notion of Apperception?

  • 4. What is the Duisburg Nachla?'s Notion of 'Apperception?

  • 5. From the Duisburg NachlaB to the Critique

  • Part II: Theory

  • 7. A Transcendental Deduction for A Priori Concepts

  • 1. Kant's Goal

  • 2. Clues to the Nature of the Argument

  • 3. The First Premise of the Transcendental Deduction

  • 4. Apriority and Activity

  • 5. A 'Transcendental' Deduction

  • 8. Synthesis: Why and How?

  • 1. Problems to be Solved

  • 2. Kant's Definition

  • 3. Synthesis and Objective Reference

  • 4. Five Syntheses and Their Relations

  • 9. Arguing for Apperception

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. 'I-Think' as the 'Cogito'; The One-step Deduction from Judgment

  • 3. What Kind of Cognition Is at Issue in the Transcendental Deduction?

  • 4. What is the Principle of Apperception?

  • 5. The Apperceptive Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept

  • 6.Combination and Self-Consciousness in the B Deduction

  • 7. Arguing from the Unity of Apperception to the Necessary Applicability of Categories to Intuitions

  • 8. Transcendental Apperception, Empirical Apperception and 'Mineness'

  • 9. Summary

  • 10. The Power of Apperception

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. What is the Power/Faculty of Apperception?

  • 3. Does the Faculty of Apperception Endure? Is it the 'Inner Principle' of a Substance?

  • 4. Does the Power of Apperception Initiate Causal Chains or Provide Impressions of Necessary Connection?

  • 5. 'Is it an Experience That I think?'

  • 6. Root Powers, Scientific Ideals and the Ground of Appearances

  • 11. 'I-Think' as the Destroyer of Rational Psychology

  • 1. Understanding Kant's Criticisms

  • 2. Kant's Earlier and Later Treatments of Rational Psychology

  • 3. 'I-Think' as the Vehicle of the Categories

  • 4. 'I-Think' as Analytically Contained in the Concept of Thought

  • 5. Does the Analysis of Cognition Imply the Existence of a Thinker?

  • 6. Why Can't Thinkers Know Themselves as Such?

  • Part III: Evaluation

  • 12. Is Kant's Theory Consistent?

  • 1. The Old Objection

  • 2. The Most Problematic Passage (A251-52)

  • 3. The Confusion about the Causes of Sensations

  • 4. A Second Look at the Most Problematic Passage

  • 5. Criticizing Rationalist Confusions

  • 6. What Kant's Epistemology and Metaphysics Imply

  • 13. The Normativity Objection

  • 1. Psychologism or Noumenalism?

  • 2. Scrutinizing Sensations and Adding 'Transcendental Content'

  • 3. Forming Concepts and Acquiring the I-Representation

  • 4. Making A Priori Principles Explicit and Testing Instances

  • 5. Normativity and the I-rule

  • Appendix to Chapter 13: Longuenesse on Concept Formation

  • 14. Is Kant's Thinker (as Such) a Free and Responsible Agent?

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. Texts Linking Theoretical and Practical Reason

  • 3. Autonomy and Accountability

  • 4. Intellectual Accountability

  • 15. Kant our Contemporary

  • 1. Supporting and Showing Relevance

  • 2. Transcendental Arguments

  • 3. Must Rational Cognition involve Self-consciousness?

  • 4. A Second Hard Problem of Consciousness?

  • 5. Other 'I's

Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2014
Genre: Importe, Philosophie
Jahrhundert: 20. & 21. Jahrhundert
Rubrik: Geisteswissenschaften
Medium: Taschenbuch
Inhalt: Kartoniert / Broschiert
ISBN-13: 9780199363728
ISBN-10: 0199363722
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Kitcher, Patricia
Hersteller: Oxford University Press
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße: 234 x 156 x 19 mm
Von/Mit: Patricia Kitcher
Erscheinungsdatum: 01.02.2014
Gewicht: 0,56 kg
Artikel-ID: 120664935
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