The original title of the conference on which this volume is based avoided a choice about how to relate the two concepts of justice and peace to one another. They can, and often are, connected in a non-contrasting fashion ("and") and/or in terms of an alternative ("or"). Whether one or the other connection is used is suggestive in itself, but in both cases it still leaves a broader set of possibilities as to how one conceives of the underlying relationship. Two basic choices seem to stand out: One would be to relate "justice" and "peace" in terms of symmetry or asymmetry. The relationship would then be construed either in terms of normative equivalence or hierarchically-ie. one being more important from a normative point of view than the other. Alternatively one could connect them in terms of either conceptual interdependence or conceptual independence-ie. one might emphasize the "and" in the title and argue that justice and peace are mutually dependent or one could conceive of both concepts as being mutually exclusive-ie. that one has to choose between them in an either/or fashion.

The prominence and particular expression of any of these ways of connecting peace and justice in different academic disciplines depends as much on disciplinary focus and traditions as it depends on specific knowledge-constitutive interests when scholars work on a particular research problem. As a result both the conceptualization of "justice" and "peace" and the connection being made between them figure quite differently in this volume due to the fact that the Cluster of Excellence on "The Formation of Normative Orders" brings together a heterogeneous interdisciplinary group of political scientists, philosophers, historians, cultural anthropologists and international law scholars. It is against this background that we thought that the title "Justice and/or Peace" would be fitting for such an interdisciplinary exchange. After all it was intended to reflect the breadth of intellectual engagement with these two concepts among colleagues from different disciplines within the Cluster as well as between them and colleagues from other universities.

In chapter 2 Michael Doyle examines the roots of the "Responsibility to Protect" (RtoP) in international law and international ethics. RtoP, Doyle argues, is in tension with established Charter law on the use of force, but it may be beginning to change the law. From the perspective of Liberal international ethics the theme of humanitarian intervention is deeply familiar in both its communitarian and cosmopolitan variants. Even the Realist and Marxist traditions include commitments to human respect that make humanitarian concerns far from foreign. The norm of RtoP builds on but narrows the liberal tradition in ways that expand international legitimacy and address the concerns of many skeptics of humanitarian intervention. The chapter further explores how RtoP evolved out of the crisis in Kosovo in the 1990s and discusses its policy significance in the contemporary world in cases in which it has been invoked-ranging from Myanmar to Kenya, Guinea and Libya. Doyle concludes that RtoP as a policy doctrine is significant but likely to remain less than revolutionary. Straightforward as the provisions of the 2005 UN Outcome Document may appear, both their significance and the will to implement them are far from clear. By contributing to the increasing pluralism of the normative architecture of world politics RtoP has produced some confusion. However, this confusion may gradually recede as RtoP norms are accumulated in customary law and reshape the discourse of international ethics.

Harald Müller examines the relationship between justice and peace in chapter 3 from a different angle arguing that "good things do not always go together". He starts with the premise that our endorsement of justice is deeply embedded in Western thought. It found expression most recently in the shape of democracy promotion. Yet, whi