Introduction: heuristics and biases then and now; Part I. Theoretical and Empirical Extensions: 1. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment; 2. Representativeness revisited: attribute substitution in intuitive judgment; 3. How alike is it versus how likely it is: a disjunction fallacy in probability judgments; 4. Imagining can heighten or lower the perceived likelihood of contracting a disease: the mediating effect of ease of imagery; 5. The availability heuristic revisited: ease of recall and content of recall as distinct sources of information; 6. Incorporating the irrelevant: anchors in judgments of belief and value; 7. Putting adjustment back in the anchoring and adjustment heuristic: differential processing of self-generate and experimenter-provided anchors; 8. Self anchoring in conversation: why language users don't do what they 'should'; 9. Inferential correction; 10. Mental contamination and the debiasing problem; 11. Sympathetic magical thinking: the contagion and similarity 'heuristics'; 12. Compatibility effects in judgment and choice; 13. The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence; 14. Inside the planning fallacy: the causes and consequences of optimistic time predictions; 15. Probability judgment across cultures; 16. Durability bias in affective forecasting; 17. Resistance of personal risk perceptions to debiasing interventions; 18. Ambiguity and self-evaluation: the role of idiosyncratic trait definitions in self-serving assessments of ability; 19. When predictions fail: the dilemma of unrealistic optimism; 20. Norm theory: comparing reality to its alternatives; 21. Counterfactual thought, regret, and superstition: how to avoid kicking yourself; Part II. New Theoretical Directions: 22. Two systems of reasoning; 23. The affect heuristic; 24. Individual differences in reasoning: implications for the rationality debate?; 25. Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probability; 26. Unpacking, repacking, and anchoring: advances in support theory; 27. Remarks on support theory: recent advances and future directions; 28. The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning; 29. Feelings as information: moods influence judgments and processing strategies; 30. Automated choice heuristics; 31. How good are fast and frugal heuristics?; 32. Intuitive politicians, theologians, and prosecutors: exploring the empirical implications of deviant functionalist metaphors; Part III. Real World Applications: 33. The hot hand in basketball: on the misperception of random sequences; 34. Like goes with like: the role of representativeness in erroneous and pseudoscientific beliefs; 35. When less is more: counterfactual thinking and satisfaction among Olympic medalists; 36. Understanding misunderstanding: social psychological perspectives; 37. Assessing uncertainty in physical constants; 38. Do analysts overreact?; 39. The calibration of expert judgment: Heuristics and biases beyond the laboratory; 40. Clinical versus actuarial judgment; 41. Heuristics and biases in application; 42. Theory driven reasoning about plausible pasts and probable futures in world politics.