This book considers the political and constitutional consequences of Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), where the Supreme Court held that partisan gerrymandering challenges could no longer be adjudicated by the courts. Through a rigorous scientific analysis of US House district maps, the authors argue that partisan bias increased dramatically in the 2010 redistricting round after the Vieth decision, both at the national and state level. From a constitutional perspective, unrestrained partisan gerrymandering poses a critical threat to a central pillar of American democracy, popular sovereignty. State legislatures now effectively determine the political composition of the US House. The book answers the Court's challenge to find a new standard for gerrymandering that is both constitutionally grounded and legally manageable. It argues that the scientifically rigorous partisan symmetry measure is an appropriate legal standard for partisan gerrymandering, as it logically implies the constitutional right to individual equality and can be practically applied.
This book considers the political and constitutional consequences of Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), where the Supreme Court held that partisan gerrymandering challenges could no longer be adjudicated by the courts. Through a rigorous scientific analysis of US House district maps, the authors argue that partisan bias increased dramatically in the 2010 redistricting round after the Vieth decision, both at the national and state level. From a constitutional perspective, unrestrained partisan gerrymandering poses a critical threat to a central pillar of American democracy, popular sovereignty. State legislatures now effectively determine the political composition of the US House. The book answers the Court's challenge to find a new standard for gerrymandering that is both constitutionally grounded and legally manageable. It argues that the scientifically rigorous partisan symmetry measure is an appropriate legal standard for partisan gerrymandering, as it logically implies the constitutional right to individual equality and can be practically applied.
Über den Autor
Anthony J. McGann is a Professor in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde. His research examines the theory and practice of democratic institutions with a focus on electoral systems and the behavior of political parties. He has published The Logic of Democracy and The Radical Right in Western Europe (with Herbert Kitschelt). His articles have been featured in the American Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Theoretical Politics, Public Choice, Comparative Political Studies, International Studies Quarterly, Electoral Studies, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Party Politics, and Legislative Studies Quarterly, among others.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1. The unnoticed revolution; 2. The jurisprudence of districting; 3. Measuring partisan bias; 4. Geographic explanations for partisan bias; 5. Political explanations of partisan bias; 6. The constitutional implications of Vieth; 7. Answering Justice Scalia's challenge to equality: does equal protection imply majority rule?; 8. Conclusion: Vieth, majority rule, and one person, one vote.
