Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics in the Department of Philosophy and the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. He holds secondary appointments in Duke's Law School and Department of Psychology and Neuroscience. He is a Partner Investigator at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Neuroethics and a Research Scientist with the Mind Research Network in New Mexico. He has served as co-chair of the Board of Officers of the American Philosophical Association and co-director of the MacArthur Law and Neuroscience Project. He earned his bachelor's degree from Amherst College and his doctorate from Yale University. He has published widely, but his current work focuses on moral artificial intelligence, free will and moral responsibility, and various topics in moral psychology and brain science. His most recent books with Oxford University Press are Think Again: How to Reason and Argue, and Clean Hands: Philosophical Lessons from Scrupulosity. He

co-directs Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy and co-teaches a MOOC, Think Again, with over 1,000,000 registered students.

Uri Maoz is a computational neuroscientist, who researches volition, decision-making, and moral choice. He joined Chapman University in 2017 as an Assistant Professor of Computational Neuroscience and Psychology at Crean College and at the Institute for Interdisciplinary Brain and Behavioral Sciences, where he uses combination of empirical techniques (e.g., EEG, intracranial recordings, behavioral studies) and modeling to develop a computational account of volition, with an emphasis on the decision-making processes that lead to voluntary action and on the role of consciousness in such processes. In particular, he uses machine-learning to carry out online, real-time, closed-loop analysis of neural data, as it is being recorded. He is further interested in the legal, ethical, and philosophical implications of this work.

• Preface


• I. Questions from Neuroscientists for Philosophers


• 1. What is an intention? - Gideon Yaffe


• 2. What is a will? - Pamela Hieronymi


• 3. When is an action voluntary? - Pamela Hieronymi


• 4. What is freedom? - Walter Sinnott-Armstrong


• 5. What is free will? - Timothy O'Connor


• 6. Can there be free will in a determined universe? - Timothy O'Connor


• 7. Does free will come in degrees? - Jonathan Hall and Tillmann Vierkant


• 8. How can we determine whether or not we have free will? - Alfred R. Mele


• 9. What kind of neuroscientific evidence, if any, could determine whether anyone has free will? - Adina L. Roskies


• 10. What kind of behavioral experiments, if any could determine whether anyone has free will? - Tim Bayne


• 11. Can a robot with artificial intelligence have free will? - Jonathan Hall and Tillmann Vierkant


• 12. Do conscious decisions cause physical actions? - Ned Block


• 13. How is consciousness related to freedom of action or will? - Tim Bayne


• 14. How is responsibility related to free will, control, and action? - Gideon Yaffe


• 15. What are reasons? - Walter Sinnott-Armstrong


• II. Questions from Philosophers for Neuroscientists


• 16. What are the main stages in the neural processes that produce actions? - Patrick Haggard and Elisabeth Parés-Pujolràs


• 17. Does the will correspond to any clearly delineated brain area or activity? - Gabriel Kreiman


• 18. How are the neural processes for deciding when to move similar and different from those for deciding what or how to move? - Antonio Ivano Triggiani and Mark Hallett


• 19. How are arbitrary and deliberate decisions similar and different? - Jye Bold, Liad Mudrik, and Uri Maoz


• 20. How do higher-level brain areas exert control over lower-level brain areas? - Mark Hallett


• 21. What are intentional actions? - Elisabeth Parés-Pujolràs and Patrick Haggard


• 22. What evidence is there that intentions are represented in the brain? - John-Dylan Haynes


• 23. What is known about the neural correlates of specific beliefs and desires that inform human choices? - Amber Hopkins and Uri Maoz


• 24. How can we determine whether or not an agent is conscious of a bit of information relevant to an action? - Liad Mudrik and Aaron Schurger


• 25. Which neural mechanisms could enable conscious control of action? - Jake Gavenas, Mark Hallett, and Uri Maoz


• 26. How does the absence of a consensus about the neural basis of consciousness and volition affect theorizing about conscious volition? - Amber Hopkins, Liad Mudrik, and Uri Maoz


• 27. How can we determine the precise timing of brain events related to action? - Mark Hallett and Aaron Schurger


• 28. How can we determine the precise timing of mental events related to action? - Sae Jin Lee, Sook Mun (Alice) Wong, Uri Maoz, and Mark Hallett


• 29. Are any neural processes truly random (or stochastic)? - Hans Liljenström


• 30. How can computational models help us understand free will? - Gabriel Kreiman, Hans Liljenström, Aaron Schurger, and Uri Maoz


• Brain Maps - Amber Hopkins and Natalie Nichols


• Glossary - Claire Simmons and Amber Hopkins


• Annotated Bibliography - Deniz Ar?türk and Amber Hopkins