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Beschreibung
This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control. It also argues that such an act is collectively rational if the acts of the group's members are rational. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but not a requirement, except in cases where agents have rationally prepared for joint action.
This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control. It also argues that such an act is collectively rational if the acts of the group's members are rational. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but not a requirement, except in cases where agents have rationally prepared for joint action.
Über den Autor
Paul Weirich is Curators' Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-Columbia
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • 1. Rationality Writ Large

  • 1.1. Collective Acts

  • 1.2. Method

  • 1.3. Guide

  • 2. Agents and Acts

  • 2.1. Agents

  • 2.2. Acts

  • 2.3. Control

  • 2.4. Evaluability

  • 3. Rationality

  • 3.1. Metatheory

  • 3.2. Attainability

  • 3.3. Comprehensiveness

  • 3.4. Compositionality

  • 4. Groups

  • 4.1. Extension

  • 4.2. Efficiency

  • 4.3. Collective Utility

  • 4.4. Compositionality

  • 5. Games of Strategy

  • 5.1. Games

  • 5.2. Solutions

  • 5.3. Standards

  • 6. Equilibrium

  • 6.1. Standards and Procedures

  • 6.2. Utility Maximization

  • 6.3. Self-Support

  • 6.4. Strategic Equilibrium

  • 6.5. Realization of an Equilibrium

  • 6.6. Appendix: Realization of a Nash Equilibrium

  • 7. Coordination

  • 7.1. Strategy and Learning

  • 7.2. Changing the Rules

  • 7.3. An Efficient Equilibrium

  • 7.4. Preparation

  • 7.5. Intentions

  • 8. Cooperative Games

  • 8.1. Joint Action

  • 8.2. Opportunities for Joint Action

  • 8.3. Coalitional Games

  • 8.4. The Core

  • 8.5. An Empty Core

  • 9. Strategy for Coalitions

  • 9.1. A Coalition's Incentives

  • 9.2. Paths of Incentives

  • 9.3. Strategic Equilibrium in Coalitional Games

  • 10. Illustrations and Comparisons

  • 10.1. The Majority-Rule Game

  • 10.2. Comparisons

  • 10.3. Conflict

  • 10.4. Collective Standards

  • 11. Compositionality

  • 11.1. Underlying Games

  • 11.2. Confirmation

  • 11.3. Agreement Games

  • 11.4. The Core and Utility Maximization

  • 11.5. Strategic Equilibrium and Self-Support

  • 12. Implications

  • 12.1. Social Institutions

  • 12.2. Strategic Equilibrium and Institutions

  • 12.3. Theoretical Unity

  • 12.4. Future Research

  • Notes

  • References

  • Index

Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2012
Fachbereich: Volkswirtschaft
Genre: Importe, Wirtschaft
Rubrik: Recht & Wirtschaft
Medium: Taschenbuch
Inhalt: Kartoniert / Broschiert
ISBN-13: 9780199929016
ISBN-10: 0199929017
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Weirich, Paul
Hersteller: Oxford University Press
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße: 234 x 156 x 15 mm
Von/Mit: Paul Weirich
Erscheinungsdatum: 01.06.2012
Gewicht: 0,436 kg
Artikel-ID: 120667584

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