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Beschreibung
In 1899, Britain faced unexpected defeats in the Second Boer War, challenging their confidence and prompting a major military reassessment.

In 1899 few readers of Rudyard Kipling's poem 'The Absent Minded Beggar, ' in which he wrote of 'Fifty thousand horse and foot going to Table Bay, ' could have supposed that this army faced any serious risk of defeat from a handful of Boer farmers. Great Britain was going to war with the Boer Republics in order to assert her supremacy over South Africa, and had mobilised a complete army corps, under General Sir Redvers Buller. This was a force considered to be more than ample to bring about rapid victory.

Yet before year's end, in the space of one week, the British Army had suffered three defeats, at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso. For the British press and public the shock was enormous. The Battle of Colenso in particular destroyed many illusions about the army's military effectiveness, and so far as the government was concerned, confidence in Buller's leadership was shattered. As commander-in-chief in South Africa, it turned to Lord Frederick Roberts, and prepared to overcome the battlefield setbacks by despatching substantial reinforcements.

Before these decisions could take effect, however, the disastrous Battle of Spion Kop had been fought, further exposing the failures in leadership the government, and the British military establishment now faced the task of recovering from these traumatic defeats, as well as discovering the reasons for them. It was not going to be easy. The Second Anglo-Boer War did not end until 1902, by which time the British forces engaged against the Boer Republics had risen tenfold in number. Nor did 'Black Week, ' as those few days in 1899 came to be known, mark the end of military setbacks in South Africa. Many painful lessons had still to be learned about combat with an enemy armed with the most modern weapons before the Boers were finally defeated. These lessons would be learned not only on the field of battle, but also at the tables of the numerous committees established to determine the reason why things had gone so wrong.
In 1899, Britain faced unexpected defeats in the Second Boer War, challenging their confidence and prompting a major military reassessment.

In 1899 few readers of Rudyard Kipling's poem 'The Absent Minded Beggar, ' in which he wrote of 'Fifty thousand horse and foot going to Table Bay, ' could have supposed that this army faced any serious risk of defeat from a handful of Boer farmers. Great Britain was going to war with the Boer Republics in order to assert her supremacy over South Africa, and had mobilised a complete army corps, under General Sir Redvers Buller. This was a force considered to be more than ample to bring about rapid victory.

Yet before year's end, in the space of one week, the British Army had suffered three defeats, at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso. For the British press and public the shock was enormous. The Battle of Colenso in particular destroyed many illusions about the army's military effectiveness, and so far as the government was concerned, confidence in Buller's leadership was shattered. As commander-in-chief in South Africa, it turned to Lord Frederick Roberts, and prepared to overcome the battlefield setbacks by despatching substantial reinforcements.

Before these decisions could take effect, however, the disastrous Battle of Spion Kop had been fought, further exposing the failures in leadership the government, and the British military establishment now faced the task of recovering from these traumatic defeats, as well as discovering the reasons for them. It was not going to be easy. The Second Anglo-Boer War did not end until 1902, by which time the British forces engaged against the Boer Republics had risen tenfold in number. Nor did 'Black Week, ' as those few days in 1899 came to be known, mark the end of military setbacks in South Africa. Many painful lessons had still to be learned about combat with an enemy armed with the most modern weapons before the Boers were finally defeated. These lessons would be learned not only on the field of battle, but also at the tables of the numerous committees established to determine the reason why things had gone so wrong.
Über den Autor
Quintin Barry was a retired solicitor and employment judge who had a distinguished career in both the public and private sectors, including roles within the NHS and local radio. A lifelong history enthusiast, he was the author of several well-regarded books on military and naval history. His notable works include a two-volume history of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, a history of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the first modern account of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Barry was particularly known for his in-depth study of the life and career of Helmuth von Moltke. His more recent publications focused on naval history, with titles such as Far Distant Ships: The Blockade of Brest 1793-1815, Crisis at the Chesapeake: The Royal Navy and the Struggle for America 1775-1783, and From Ushant to Gibraltar: The Channel Fleet 1778-1783. Barry's work remains highly regarded by historians and enthusiasts of military and naval affairs. Quintin passed away in January 2025.
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2024
Genre: Geschichte, Importe
Rubrik: Geisteswissenschaften
Medium: Buch
Reihe: From Musket to Maxim 1815-1914
Inhalt: Gebunden
ISBN-13: 9781804511862
ISBN-10: 1804511862
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Gebunden
Autor: Barry, Quintin
Hersteller: Helion & Company
From Musket to Maxim 1815-1914
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße: 251 x 176 x 15 mm
Von/Mit: Quintin Barry
Erscheinungsdatum: 12.09.2024
Gewicht: 0,72 kg
Artikel-ID: 124042099