John Fennell is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Grinnell College in Grinnell, Iowa.

Introduction: Logico-Semantics, Logical Positivism and their Discontents

Chapter One: The Classical Empiricist Account of Meaning

§ 1.1: The Inessentiality of language

§ 1.2: The "'Idea' Idea"

§ 1.3: The Primacy of the Naming Relation

§ 1.4: The Linguistic Turn, Anti-Psychologism, and the Primacy of the Sentence

§ 1.5: Logical Analysis

Chapter Two:Classical Empiricism and the Problem of the A Priori: Mill, Kant, and Frege

§ 2.1: Some Background Distinctions: A Priori/A Posteriori, Analytic/Synthetic, Necessary/Contingent

§ 2.2: Mill

§ 2.3: Kant

§ 2.4: Frege

§ 2.5: Appendix: Russell's Set-Theoretic Paradox

Chapter Three: Frege's Begriffsschrift

§ 3.1: Logic and its Limitations

§ 3.2: Function and Argument

§ 3.3: Predicates, Quantifiers and the Solution to the Problem of Multiple Generality

§ 3.4: Sentence Connectives and the Solution to the Problem of a Unified Logical Notation

§ 3.5: Identity

§ 3.6: Appendix: Concordance between Begriffsschrift Notation and the Kalish/Montague/Mar Notation

Chapter Four: Frege on Sense and Reference

§ 4.1: Three Semantic Puzzles for a Reference-Only (Extensionalist) Account of Meaning

§ 4.2: The Sense/Reference Distinction

§ 4.3: The Problems of Non-Referring Singular Terms and Identity Statements

§ 4.4: The Problem of Belief Contexts

§ 4.5: Problems with Frege's Solution

§ 4.6: Definite Descriptions and Some Further Consequences of Frege's Sense/Reference Distinction

Chapter Five: Russell's Theory of Descriptions

§ 5.1: Scope and Basic Strategy of the Theory of Descriptions

§ 5.2: The Theory Applied to Definite Descriptions, including Non-Referring Definite Descriptions

§ 5.3: Four Key Features of Russell's Analysis of Definite Descriptions

§ 5.4: Russell's Solutions to Some Semantic Puzzles

§ 5.5: Russell's Theory and Excluded Middle

§ 5.6: Critical Discussion (I): Strawson

§ 5.7: Critical Discussion (II): Donnellan

Chapter Six: Kripke's Causal Theory of Reference

§ 6.1: Core Features of Russell's Theory

§ 6.2: Three Key Problems for Russell's Description Theory

§ 6.3: The Cluster Theory and its Analogous Problems

§ 6.4: Correct Descriptions are neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Names to Refer

§ 6.5: The Causal Theory of Reference-Grounding and Reference-Borrowing

§ 6.6: The Causal Theory's Solution to the Three Problems

§ 6.7: Rigid Designation and Necessary A Posteriori Propositions

§ 6.8: The Distinction between Fixing the Reference and Giving the Meaning

§ 6.9: The Contingency of 'Hesperus is the evening star' v. The Necessity of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'

§ 6.10: Problems for Kripke's View

Chapter Seven: Logical Positivism I: Ayer

§ 7.1: Three Central Doctrines of Logical Positivism

§ 7.2: Realist v. Anti-Realist Accounts of Meaning

§ 7.3: Versions of the Verification Principle

§ 7.4: The Problem of the A Priori (again)

§ 7.5: Questions regarding Conventionalism about Necessity and Logic

Chapter Eight: Logical Positivism II: Carnap

§ 8.1: Conventionalism

§ 8.2: Linguistic Frameworks

§ 8.3: Internal v. External Questions and Formal v. Material Mode

§ 8.4: Metaphysics and Tolerance

§ 8.5: The Status of Philosophy

Chapter Nine:Quine's Critique of Positivism I: 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'

§ 9.1: 'No Entity without Identity'

§ 9.2: Two Different Conceptions of Synonymy: Definition and Substitution

§ 9.3: Epistemic Holism and the Rejection of Meaning and Synonymy

§ 9.4: Epistemic Holism and the Elimination of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

§ 9.5: Epistemic Holism and the Web of Belief

§ 9.6: Epistemic Holism, Fallibilism and the History of Science

Chapter Ten: Quine's Critique of Positivism II: Anti-Conventionalism

§ 10.1: Quine's Problems with Conventionalism

§ 10.2: Quine's Pragmatic Account of Logic and Necessity

§ 10.3: Problems with Quine's Pragmatization of Logic: Dummett and Davidson

Chapter Eleven: Quine: Radical Translation and the Indeterminacy of Meaning

§ 11.1: Occasion Sentences, Standing Sentences, Stimulus Meaning, and Stimulus Synonymy

§ 11.2: The Argument for Indeterminacy: Holism and Behaviorism

§ 11.3: First-Personal and Ontological Indeterminacy v. Third-Personal and Epistemological Under-Determination

§ 11.4: The Principle of Charity: Pragmatic or Constitutive

§ 11.5: Some Problems with Charity and Logic.

Chapter Twelve: Later-Wittgenstein I: Ordinary Language Philosophy and the Critique of Ostension

§ 12.1: Ordinary Language Philosophy, Grammatical Investigations and Language Games

§ 12.2: The Critique of the Augustinian Picture: The Language Games of the Grocer and the Builders

§ 12.3: Wittgenstein's Critique of Ostensive Definition

Chapter Thirteen: Later-Wittgenstein II: The Rule-Following Considerations

§ 13.1: The Problem of Meaning Scepticism

§ 13.2: Algorithms and Dispositions

§ 13.3: Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Community Dispositionalism and the 'Sceptical Solution'

§ 13.4: Textual Evidence For and Against Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein

§ 13.5: Normatively-Rich Practices: Sociality

§ 13.6: Normatively-Rich Practices: Contextualism and Fallibilism

Chapter Fourteen: Later-Wittgenstein III: The Private Language Argument

§ 14.1: The Relation between the Rule-Following Discussion and the Private Language Argument

§ 14.2: The 'Independent Check' Argument

§ 14.3: The Independent Check Argument Evaluated: Ayer's Objection and Kripke's Footnote 47

§ 14.4: The Grammatical Status of Two Statements of Privacy

§ 14.5: The Expressive (Not Descriptive) Grammar of Sensation Talk

§ 14.6: Wittgenstein and Behaviorism